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1 Introduction 
 
There are roughly 45 wars waged in 35 countries, six genocides, and nine 
nests of violence taking place continuously [2]. The number of wars has 
not changed significantly throughout later history, but the face of war has 
changed with the development of society. The development of the society 
and the development of warfare goes hand in hand. In fact, the concept of 
war hardly existed before the first societies emerged around fertile soil, 
during which period wars were fought for agricultural reasons. The 
emergence of the nation-state gave rise to national armed forces, and once 
industrialization began, weapons and materiel could be mass produced. 
Advances in science and technology resulted in the development of 
communication systems, which gradually led the societies into the so 
called Information Age. The key factors in this development were 
information technology and communication networks, which enabled 
information to be collected, processed, analyzed, and distributed 
efficiently.  
 
The Information Age also brought changes into warfare, and new concepts 
such as information warfare and network-centric warfare emerged. 
Information in warfare is nothing new, but the role of information has 
changed. It is no longer used solely for intelligence, but has become a 
target and a weapon in itself. With the help of information and 
communication technology, it is possible to efficiently spread information 
- or disinformation - anywhere in the world. In network-centric warfare, 
information plays a key role in providing real-time situation awareness. 
The network allows information to be collected and distributed over large 
geographical areas in practically no time. The main objective is to gain 
information superiority over the enemy, and to thus be able to make more 
accurate decisions while denying the enemy from doing the same.  
 
As a result of this change, the focus has shifted from mass- and platform-
centricity to information and network-centricity. Although the 
transformation is done to enhance the quality of the decision making, it 
also comes with some challenges. Since information can be targeted, it can 
be used as a means of affecting decision making. Networks are known to 
be vulnerable to attacks, hence opening up another opportunity for 
affecting decision making. Furthermore, the decision making process 
typically produces a decision which is to be implemented. This decision 
can be communicated over the network. Also the network itself may 
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change as a result of the action taken. Hence, there is a clear interaction 
between the decision making process and the network-centric environment 
with respect to information. 
 
To protect the decision making process from attacks stemming from the 
network-centric environment, the network-centric environment must be 
secured. The current trend in military networking is to rely on open 
standards and commercially off the shelf (COTS) products, such as IP 
technology. The problem with Internet technologies is that the Internet was 
built upon technology developed to withstand nuclear attacks, but security 
was never a main concern until the Internet was commercialized. Adding 
security into existing protocols is never a trivial task. Hence, regardless of 
the multitude of available security solutions, the networks are still 
vulnerable to attacks. This is a problem already in the current Internet, 
which for the most parts is static, wired, and operates in a civilian, non-
hostile environment. The problems become worse when the same 
technologies are deployed in a military environment, which is hostile, 
dynamic, mainly wireless, and affected by weather conditions, terrains, 
etc. Unless security can be ensured in this environment, the network 
becomes useless as a tool for decision making and military leadership. 
 
The problems with securing the network in the military environment are 
many-fold. The dynamic nature of the network means that security 
associations change on a frequent basis as network nodes move. Due to the 
large size of the network, it is impossible for nodes to store security 
associations of other nodes than those they are currently communicating 
with. Hence, whenever a change in the network occurs, new security 
associations must be negotiated. Traditional protocols are typically too 
heavy to be used in practice where the network resources are scarce and 
the nodes may move too rapidly for the negotiation to have time to finish. 
The wireless network medium is not only vulnerable to attacks, it also 
leaks important information about the network and the intent of the forces 
to the enemy. Hiding the network is practically impossible. Furthermore, 
the hostility of the environment introduces completely new challenges, 
such as compromised nodes. A compromised node is a legitimate node 
which is controlled by the enemy. Hence, the attacks stem from within the 
network, and all traditional security solutions are bypassed. Cryptography 
is hardly of any use as the compromised node has access to the 
cryptographic keys that it needs.  
 
If the security of the network fails, the enemy is able to affect the decision 
making process. Information may be denied, delayed, or modified, hence 
affecting the situational awareness. Eventually, information will contradict 
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with the situation at hand, causing confusion, and thus delaying decision 
making even further. Hence, the decisions made may be wrong or delayed, 
both of which benefit the enemy. 
 
1.1 Problem statement 
 
In a network-centric environment, the network provides support for 
decision making by allowing information to be collected, processed, 
analyzed, and distributed in an efficient manner. The importance of space 
and time has decreased since the network allows communication between 
entities regardless of location. The network can provide a decision maker 
with real-time situation awareness, based on which the decision maker can 
take a course of action, and communicate his intent to other entities. 
 
In this thesis, the interaction between the network-centric environment and 
the decision making process is analyzed. The objective of the thesis is to 
show how decision making can be affected through the network as well as 
to propose a set of solutions to secure the network and thus protect the 
decision making process. Decision making is studied both from a human 
and computer perspective. From the human perspective, the role of the 
network is to provide accurate and timely information. From the computer 
perspective, the signaling data must be sound to enable optimal network 
operation. 
 
The vulnerability analysis is made based on a set of attack scenarios. In the 
scenarios, the main problems with military networking are described. 
Based on the scenario analysis, the main security requirements are 
identified and listed. The solutions proposed to the discovered problems 
are analyzed with respect to the requirements and the attack scenarios. It is 
shown that while some of the requirements can be met under many 
circumstances, open problems still exist, and some solutions contradict 
each other with respect to the requirements. 
 
 
1.2 Own contributions 
 
This thesis contains the following contributions: 
 
• An analysis of how the decision making process can be affected in 
a network-centric environment. The decision making process is 
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modeled with the OODA loop. The analysis focuses on the role of 
the network with respect to the OODA loop and shows possible 
vulnerabilities. The decision making process with respect to the 
network-centric environment is described in Section 5. 
• Security requirements to the communication network to protect the 
decision making process. Based on the previous analysis, a set of 
security requirements are listed to cover the main problems. The 
security requirements are identified in Section 5.  
• Analysis of the impact of compromised nodes to the network. 
Traditionally, security solutions have been developed with the aim 
of protecting the network from external attacks. However, in a 
military environment, where nodes are likely to become 
compromised, the attacks may stem from within the network. In 
such a case, the traditional security solutions have been bypassed. 
The analysis focuses on the damage that compromised nodes can 
impose on the network as well as how they can affect the decision 
making process. The problem with compromised nodes is 
analyzed in Section 5. 
 
Furthermore, the thesis proposes a set of technical solutions or models to 
cope with the problems. The thesis contains the following contributions: 
 
• Packet level authentication (PLA). The PLA architecture has been 
developed to secure the infrastructure. PLA makes it possible to 
verify the authenticity of a sender as well as the integrity, 
timeliness, and uniqueness of an IP packet. Based on this, it is 
possible to limit denial-of-service attacks, secure protocol 
signaling, provide access control, and so on. 
• Context Aware Management (CAM). The CAM architecture 
enables a node to rapidly adapt to a frequently changing 
environment.  
• Self-healing networks. A method for a partially destroyed network 
to automatically rebuild itself has been developed. The method 
relies on PLA for security and on the CAM architecture to allow 
nodes to adapt to the changes. The basic idea is to replace 
destroyed nodes by any available nodes in the environment by 
assigning them new tasks. 
• Trust management based on incomplete trust. The concept of 
incomplete trust is introduced as an idea of how to perform trust 
management in a hostile environment with compromised nodes. 
The incomplete trust model is more flexible than previous models 
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which assume that nodes are either completely trustworthy or 
completely untrustworthy. 
• Privacy protection. The thesis does not propose any new privacy 
solutions, however, privacy is divided into six different categories, 
and the problems and most important current solutions are 
identified and discussed.  
 
The solutions are described in Section 6. 
 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: 
 
Section 2 presents a short history of the development of warfare. This 
development is compared to the development of the society; only when 
societies started to emerge did the concept of warfare develop. The Section 
describes the development of warfare from the agricultural society to the 
information society of today. 
 
The information society is a result of the development of information and 
communication technology. The trend in military networking is to rely on 
open standards and commercially-off-the-shelf products. In Section 3, the 
development of networks based on open standards, mainly IP, is described. 
The Section starts with the development of the Internet and follows the 
development into wireless, mobile, and ad hoc network technologies. 
 
The communication network, however, is not a means in itself. The 
purpose of the network in a military scenario is to enhance decision 
making. Section 4 presents the OODA loop, which is a decision making 
model created by Col. John Boyd (deceased) from the US Air Force.  
 
In Section 5, the OODA loop is applied to a network-centric environment. 
This Section analyzes various means of affecting decision making through 
the communication network. Possible attack scenarios are presented, and it 
is shown that the networks present a vulnerability into the decision making 
process. Hence, a set of security requirements is listed. 
 
In Section 6, a set of solutions to deal with the security problems are 
presented. The solutions attempt to cover the requirements presented in the 
previous Section. 
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In Section 7, the solutions are analyzed with respect to the security 
requirements and the attack scenarios. While many problems can be solved 
by the new solutions presented, some issues still remain unsolved. 
 
Finally, Section 8 concludes the thesis with summarizing the results and 
analyzing the applicability to the civilian environment. 
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2 The development of warfare 
 
The development of society typically affects the development of warfare. 
In [88], Toffler describes the changes of societies as a succession of rolling 
waves. Before the First Wave, people lived in small migratory groups who 
fed themselves by hunting, fishing, collecting, and herding. The First 
Wave of change gave rise to the agricultural society; villages and 
settlements started to form around areas with fertile soil. From roughly 
8000 B.C. to the 18th century A.D. the agricultural society was the 
dominating way of life. The Second Wave started to take over roughly in 
1650-1750, when industrialization slowly began to evolve. In the 19th 
century, industrialization had changed the society; new inventions 
emerged, technology advanced, and mass production began.  As 
technology, especially information technology, advanced further in the 
middle of the 20th century, the Second Wave started to lose force and the 
Third Wave started to build up and approach. The Third Wave brought the 
society into the Information Age.  
 
In [89], Toffler argues that the development of warfare can be described 
using the same waves. 
 
Before the First Wave, battles occurred in the pre-agricultural tribes, 
however, violence is not synonymous to warfare. It was during the First 
Wave that the permanent settlements with their social and political 
environment gave birth to the concept of war. First of all, the agricultural 
society was able to produce and store an economic surplus worth fighting 
for. Second, it hastened the development into nation states. Typically, 
warfare in the First Wave was limited to a small area, and people gathered 
to fight did so because they had similar interests, namely to defend one's 
own land or acquire more land from another society. Weapons were hand 
made, non-standardized, and mainly designed for close combat. 
Communications were primitive; orders were mainly oral and not written. 
Although the size, capability, morale, leadership quality, and training 
between armies of the First Wave varied a lot, they all had one thing in 
common: warfare was about agriculture. 
 
The Second Wave brought mass production, standardization, and 
technology into the army. Napoleon introduced the mass army in the 
beginning of the 19th century, however, the industrialized army did not 
appear until the 1840s when mass production of weapons became 
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common. The way wars were fought had changed radically. The armies no 
longer belonged to a warlord, local landowner, or clan leader, but to a 
nation-state. Wars were fought over large areas and the amount of human 
and materiel resources were huge. The concept of mass destruction became 
a prominent factor for industrial-age warfare. Advances in technology also 
found their place on the battlefield. Towards the end of the century, the 
first electrical communication networks emerged. Morse had refined his 
code in the 1840s, telegraph stations soon started to emerge, and slowly 
thereafter the wireless spectrum could be utilized. For example, Great 
Britain cabled most of its empire and built wireless transceiver stations 
around the coasts to communicate with its fleet. It has even been argued 
that the British Empire owed its existence to its network rather than its 
Navy. Also Germany had linked its possessions and added wireless 
stations, and by 1914 it was claimed to have the most advanced network in 
the world. The first telegraphic messages over cables seemed to have been 
sent during the Crimean war, although their significance for military 
intelligence was limited, partially because of the messages arriving as late 
as 24 hours after having been sent due to the number of relay stations on 
the way, partially because the messages could be error prone and many 
commanders simply decided to ignore them. By the outburst of the First 
World War, however, the usage of communications had been more widely 
adopted by the militaries in Europe (in particular).  [43]  
 
The Third Wave brought significant changes into warfare. Although 
warfare today is still a combination of Second and Third Wave factors, the 
emphasis on information has become prominent. Information has of course 
always been important in warfare, but currently it is being placed at the 
core of military power. One indicator of its importance is the 
computerization and use and development of advanced communication 
technology. The concept of "information warfare" has developed. In the 
old days, information was used mainly as a guidance as how to deploy and 
move the forces. In the information age, information is more than mere 
intelligence; it is used both as a target and a weapon. Technology has 
provided the means to collect, process, and distribute large quantities of 
information (or rather, data) in practically no time, thus eliminating the 
previous restrictions caused by space and time. The purpose of information 
now is to acquire a real-time situation awareness and preventing the enemy 
from doing the same, thus gaining information superiority. Together with 
technology and the new role of information, the trend in war fighting is 
towards network-centric forces consisting of small units equipped with 
intelligent technology and weapon systems with more accuracy and 
firepower. 
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2.1 Information warfare 
 
Information in warfare is nothing new. Throughout history, information 
has always played a key role as a contributor to victory. Sun Tzu [86] and 
Clausewitz [15] both emphasized the role of information in warfare: Sun 
Tzu talks about knowing oneself and the enemy, while Clausewitz 
describes warfare using terms such as fog (uncertainty) and friction (the 
unforeseeable incidents that lower the level of performance so that one 
falls short of ones goals). Until recently, the role of information has been 
related to intelligence, i.e. knowledge of where the enemy forces are, what 
their strength is, and so on. With the proliferation of modern information 
technology, the role of information has changed. It is not limited to 
intelligence, but has also become both a target and a weapon. This has 
given rise to the term information warfare. Although enabled by 
information systems, information warfare is not about technology, but 
about information. Information systems can be utilized as a means of 
conducting information operations, but they are by far not the only viable 
means. For example, psychological operations can be carried out with the 
use of images and the media. The role of technology here is that it makes it 
possible to create, process, and distribute enormous amounts of images to a 
large community in a short period of time. Yet, it is the images that are the 
"information", for example, they may be used as a weapon to affect public 
opinion that will put pressure on political and military decision making.  
 
There is no single definition of information warfare or information 
operations. In general, information warfare is considered to be the 
information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to 
achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or 
adversaries. It is the act of influencing the civil or military decision 
making, operational capability, and the public opinion by using 
information and information processing both as a target and a weapon, and 
to protect oneself against such influence. Thus, information warfare has 
both an offensive and a defensive side. Information warfare can be carried 
out by civil, political, psychological, social, economical, and military 
means on a strategic, operational, and tactical level.  
 
Information operations in turn are actions taken to affect adversary 
information and information systems while protecting one’s own 
information and information systems. An information operation is a 
civilian and/or military operation of information warfare. In [30], 
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information operations (INFO OPS) is defined as the measures deployed in 
order to affect information, information based processes, command and 
control systems (C2S), and information and communication systems while 
taking advantage of and protecting one’s own information, C2S, and 
information and communication systems. Information operations take 
advantage of the interface between technological advances and the most 
critical aspect in warfare, namely the human being. Whereas information 
warfare is waged only during a conflict or war, information operations are 
carried out also during time of peace. 
 
The scope of information warfare is depicted in Figure 1 [36]. As can be 
seen from the picture, information warfare is divided into an offensive and 
a defensive mode. Furthermore, information warfare comprises everything 
from physical and technology based tactics to psychological, human-
oriented tactics.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 The scope of information warfare 
 
Physical destruction refers to the actual destruction of e.g. equipment as a 
result of bombing or sabotage. Defense mechanisms include various access 
control mechanisms, such as locks and keys, magnetic cards, smart cards, 
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or systems based on biometrics. The armed forces are responsible for 
protecting the physical territory of a nation.  
 
Attacks on information technology may take several forms. One of the 
major problems today is viruses and other malicious software (worms, 
trojan horses, backdoors, etc.), as they are able to spread through the 
network and infect practically all vulnerable systems in very short periods 
of time. Malicious hacking and cracking attacks exploit vulnerabilities in 
systems or protocols, for example, in order to take control of a computer or 
steal information. Typical security solutions for attacks on information 
technology include firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems, 
anti-virus software, anti-spyware software, cryptographic protocols, and 
access control mechanisms.  
 
Internal attacks are always difficult to handle because they bypass 
traditional security solutions. Employees typically have access to the 
premises or systems from within and a compromised computer has access 
to the system according to its credentials. A compromised user may be an 
industrial spy or a previously well behaved employee who has become 
dissatisfied with his work and has decided to harm the company for fun or 
because someone pays him to do so. People also tend to be gullible, 
making it possible to perform successful social engineering attacks, such 
as tricking the user into giving his password. Coping with internal attacks 
on the communication network is difficult, because the behavior of nodes 
needs to be monitored, and even then it is difficult to spot anomalies. 
Typically, computers are protected from becoming compromised in the 
first place by being kept up to date and properly configured, having 
firewalls and intrusion detection/prevention systems installed, and by 
security auditing. As far as staff is concerned, security education and 
document classification can to some extent be used to prevent social 
engineering from succeeding and information from leaking to the outside.  
 
Surveillance and intelligence gathering does not necessarily involve any 
criminal activities. People and organizations give out a lot of information 
about themselves on web pages, in news papers, and in interviews. It is 
thus possible to collect a lot of intelligence merely by observation. 
Naturally, also illegal means may be used to gather intelligence. To protect 
the people and the organization, staff education programs and security 
policies are needed. Educated users may be better aware of what 
information to disseminate and under what circumstances. For example, 
politicians that are often interviewed by the media usually receive some 
form of media training, not only to be convincing per se, but also to know 
what not to say. Security policies state clearly who is allowed to do what, 
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for example, many systems prevent unauthorized users from performing 
actions they are not allowed to perform. Document classification is one 
part of security policy; only a certain group of people are allowed to see 
certain documents.  
 
Psychological operations and propaganda are perhaps the most traditional 
forms of information warfare. The purpose of psychological operations is 
to affect the mind and thus decision making of another party while 
protecting oneself from corresponding operations. Propaganda is one 
means of carrying out psychological operations. For example, in a 
democratic society, it is important that the public supports the actions of 
the government. If the government wants to go to war, propaganda can be 
used to demonize the other party, so that the public feels that the war is 
justified, and thus accepts it. Another powerful tool for psychological 
warfare is disinformation, which on tactical and operational levels is 
referred to as deception. For example, deception was used in the invasion 
of Normandy during the Second World War, when the German forces 
were deployed near Calais rather than Normandy. Education is perhaps the 
best means of protecting against propaganda, as people understand to 
question what they see and hear, and are able to take a critical viewpoint 
rather than believe everything that is fed to them.  
 
 
The most commonly referred to model of information warfare is the 
"Libicki model". Libicki [51] defines seven forms of information warfare: 
 
• Command and control warfare (C2W): C2W is the military aspect 
of information warfare. In [30], C2W is defined as the integrated 
use of all military capacities, including operations security 
(OPSEC), feinting, psychological operations (PSYOPS), 
electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction. The purpose is 
to affect, weaken, destroy, or deny information to the C2S of an 
adversary, and to defend one’s own C2W from corresponding 
attacks. 
 
• Intelligence based warfare: the integration of sensors, emitters, and 
processors into a reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, 
and battlefield damage assessment system. 
 
• Electronic warfare: electronic warfare is surveillance and 
intelligence gathering from systems deploying or transmitting 
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electronic radiation, the act of influencing such systems, and 
protection from the influence of such systems.  
 
• Psychological warfare: psychological warfare is the act of 
influencing the values, attitudes, opinions, feelings, motives, 
decision making, and behavior of people. The defensive side of 
psychological warfare is to maintain and improve the combat will 
by protecting one’s own forces as well as the civilian population 
from psychological operations launched by an adversary and from 
self-inflicted actions (such as baseless rumors). The offensive side 
of psychological warfare is to deteriorate the combat will of the 
forces of an adversary by spreading information that will affect the 
mental state of the adversary, causing e.g. fear, hesitation, and 
stress. It also includes the act of influencing the civilian population 
of the adversary. 
 
• Hacker warfare: in [52], hacker warfare is defined as information 
warfare that seeks to damage computer systems by exploiting 
vulnerabilities in them. 
 
• Economic information warfare: the manipulation of information 
exchanged in trade (either denial or exploitation) as an instrument 
of state policy. 
 
• Cyber warfare: also known as net warfare. In [19], cyber warfare 
is information warfare conducted in cyberspace, where cyberspace 
refers to computer systems, networks, communication systems, 
and all their supporting infrastructure and operations. It is the act 
of influencing information systems, information transmission, or 
the information itself, and to protect one’s own information, 
information systems, and information transmissions. 
 
Although the Libicki model starts to be outdated, it is still commonly 
referred to in the literature, since it grasps the main elements of 
information warfare. 
 
From the point of view of this thesis, the technical aspects of information 
warfare are of main interest.  
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2.2 Network-centric warfare 
 
In [1], network-centric warfare (NCW) is defined as an information 
superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat 
power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve 
shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of 
operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-
synchronization. 
 
Traditionally, the forces have suffered from limitations in their ability to 
communicate, move, and project effects. Thus, the forces and their 
supporting elements have had to be co-located, or in close proximity, to 
the enemy or the target they were defending. The result was that a 
geographically dispersed force was weak and unable to rapidly respond to 
or mount a concentrated attack. One purpose of network-centric warfare is 
to eliminate the geo-locational constraints by networking the forces using 
the most advanced technologies available.  
 
As a result of networking, the forces become more knowledgeable than 
before. The knowledge is dependent on a continuous stream of timely and 
accurate information, as well as the processing power, tools, and expertise 
necessary to put battle space information into context and turn it into battle 
space knowledge.  
 
Furthermore, the effective linking of forces means that dispersed and 
distributed entities can generate synergy, and responsibility and work can 
be dynamically reallocated to adapt to the situation. Effective linking 
requires the establishment of a robust, high-performance information 
infrastructure (infostructure) that provides all elements of the forces with 
access to high-quality information services. 
 
Network-centric warfare recognizes three domains [22]: 
 
Physical domain: the physical domain is the traditional domain of 
warfare. The physical platforms and the communication networks that 
connect them reside in this domain. This is also where strikes, protection, 
and maneuver take place across the ground, sea, air, and space 
environments. To conduct network-centric operations, all elements of the 
force must be robustly networked achieving secure and seamless 
connectivity. 
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Information domain: the information domain is where information is 
created, processed, and shared. In this domain, the communication of 
information between war-fighters is facilitated, the command and control 
of modern military forces is communicated, and where the intent of the 
commander is conveyed. In the battle for information superiority, the 
information domain is ground zero. To conduct network-centric 
operations, the force should be able to collect, share, access, and protect 
information. It should have the capability to collaborate and thus improve 
its information position through processes of correlation, fusion, and 
analysis. 
 
Cognitive domain: the cognitive domain is in the mind of the war-fighter 
and the war-fighter’s supporting populace. The elements of this domain 
include leadership, morale, unit cohesion, level of training and experience, 
situational awareness, and public opinion. The commander’s intent, 
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures also reside in the cognitive 
domain. To conduct network-centric operations, the force should be able to 
develop and share high-quality situational awareness, self-synchronize its 
operations, and develop a shared knowledge of the intent of the 
commander. 
 
 
The physical and information domains are of most interest for the purpose 
of this thesis. As the thesis is concerned with securing military networks to 
ensure decision making, the networks of the physical domains must be 
secured in order to protect the information in the information domain, as 
this information will affect the way decisions are made. 
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3 The development of communication technology 
 
The development of networking technology in the civilian and the military 
environment have gone hand in hand. Originally, the political environment 
during the Cold War started the development of packet switched 
networking, which evolved into the Internet. As the business value of 
Internet was realized, the development was taken over more and more by 
commercial interests. The current trend in military networking is to use 
COTS products based on open standards, where the IP standard is a de 
facto choice for the underlying communication protocol. Solutions are no 
longer developed separately for the civilian world and the military world, 
but are rather tailored to meet the various needs of its users. 
 
In this Section, the development of communication technology is covered 
in quite extensive detail. The motivation behind the thorough description is 
to describe the various features that communication technologies may 
provide, as they are all taken advantage of for military communications. In 
order to secure the network, it is vital to understand its heterogeneous 
nature. 
 
3.1 The Internet 
 
As a response to the USSR launching Sputnik in 1957, the first artificial 
earth satellite, the US formed the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA) within the Department of Defense (DoD) in 1958 with the 
objective of establishing US lead in science and technology applicable to 
the military [97]. In the 1960s, separate groups of researchers worked on 
networking and packet switched technologies. The first packet switching 
theory was published by Kleinrock [47] in 1961 and a galactic network 
concept was envisioned by Licklider in 1962 [53]. In 1965 the first 
experimental network connecting two computers was established over a 
1200 bps phone line between a TX-2 at MIT Lincoln Lab and an AN/FSQ-
32 at System Development Corporation. The experiment showed that time-
shared computers could work well together, but that the circuit switched 
telephone system was inadequate for the job. [52] During the same times, 
three separate but parallel works were done on developing packet 
switching: one at MIT (1961-167), RAND (1962-1965), and NPL (1964-
1967). In 1967, a plan for ARPANET, a packet switched network for time-
shared computers, was published, and in 1969, the first packet-switched 
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network comprising four nodes was established. The nodes were located at 
UCLA, Stanford Research Institute (SRI), UC Santa Barbara, and 
University of Utah.  
 
The research advanced rapidly and a host-to-host protocol, Network 
Control Protocol (NCP), was finished in 1970 [14]. Application 
development could commence in 1971-1972, with email being the hot 
application in 1972. ARPANET had grown from the original four nodes to 
15 nodes (23 hosts). The growth continued, and ARPANET eventually 
evolved into the Internet as a result of an open architecture networking 
concept introduced by Kahn in 1972. The basic idea was to enable multiple 
independent networks of arbitrary design to interconnect, such as the 
original ARPANET, packet satellite networks, ground-based packet radio 
networks, and so on. A new version of the NCP protocol was developed, 
namely TCP/IP, which was later redesigned into two separate protocols, 
TCP and IP, and a new protocol, UDP, was introduced. DARPA funded 
three separate implementations of TCP/IP, which was the beginning of 
long-term experimentation and development of Internet concepts and 
technology. Several networks of varying type were incorporated to the 
Internet environment. The growth resulted in network classes (A, B, and 
C), host names and DNS, routing infrastructure changes, and so on. By 
1985, Internet was well established as a technology supporting a broad 
community of researchers and developers, and was beginning to be used 
by other communities for daily computer communications.  
 
The commercialization of the Internet began in the early 1980s as several 
vendors implemented the technology and service providers offered 
connectivity and basic services. In the 1990s, the commercialization took 
new forms; business models were found from utilizing the network for 
commercial purposes. Shopping malls, cyberbanks, radio stations, and 
several other services, appeared on the Internet. Also the media started to 
take notice of the Internet. However, it was not until the introduction of the 
World Wide Web with its easy to use web browsers that the growth of 
Internet exploded.  
 
Today, the Internet has become a commodity taken for granted. The 
society is partially dependent on its communication infrastructures; 
businesses rely on the Internet for communication and commerce,  
government systems are based on open networks, military, law 
enforcement, and rescue organizations utilize the infrastructure, and also 
the citizens have become accustomed to the availability of a variety of 
networks. The technology still continues to evolve, where current trends 
include mobility of network nodes and complete networks, ubiquitous 
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computing, ad hoc and sensor networking, and so on. Also "Internet 2" is 
developed, which is envisioned to be the "Internet of tomorrow". It is not a 
separate physical network, but rather a set of new technologies to replace 
the ones used in the Internet today. 
 
The biggest change the Internet is about to go through today is switching 
to use IPv6 instead of IPv4. IPv6 will not only introduce a larger address 
space, it will also come with increased security features, support for 
mobility, the ability to do QoS provisioning, and the possibility to take 
advantage of extension headers (enabling protocol development without 
breaking the IP stack). Most of these features are included in IPv4, 
however, the IPv6 protocol has been redesigned and the features are in 
some cases implemented differently. Furthermore, also development in 
lower level technologies (such as that of the access medium), have affected 
the way internetworking is done. For example, wireless networking has 
developed rapidly and continues to develop, as users wish to remain 
connected while moving.  
 
In the following Subsections, wireless networking, mobility, and ad hoc 
networking will be described in further detail. The discussion is motivated 
by the fact that both military and civilian networks are increasingly 
wireless and mobile. Furthermore, in the military scenario, ad hoc 
networks are relied on to ensure communication in difficult environments, 
such as the battlefield. Both the military and civilian environments rely on 
the same technologies, however, many of the requirements are different. 
For example, the military environment places higher demands on fast 
mobility support and security than the civilian environment. Since military 
decision making will partially be based on information retrieved from or 
through the network, it is important for the threat analysis and the required 
solutions to security problems that the underlying network environment is 
well understood. Hence, the rest of this Section will be devoted to 
describing the evolution of wireless and mobile networks. 
 
3.2 Wireless networks 
 
As the need to stay connected while on the move increased, wireless 
technologies have rapidly evolved. Initially, satellite communications were 
used to support connectivity where none was available, for example, for 
maritime travel. The benefit of satellite communications is that it is 
possible to provide coverage over the whole earth, including the poles. 
However, satellite communications have not until recently been available 
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to the normal consumer due to the high usage fees. Although the fees 
today are comparable to roaming GSM fees, satellite communications do 
not provide a feasible solution to the growing demand for wireless 
services, even when IP based communication is supported. Hence, several 
wireless technologies have evolved, most of which support IP based 
communication. 
 
The "Everything over IP, IP over everything" paradigm that had been 
deployed when designing the Internet architecture made it possible to 
develop applications and wireless technologies independently, see Figure 
2. Applications are completely unaware of the underlying network, and the 
network in turn is not concerned with the content of the traffic. The only 
common factor they have is the IP protocol, hence the hourglass analogy. 
However, the wireless medium introduces some problems for the TCP/IP 
protocols, for example, if there is one bad link on the path from source to 
destination, the sender may be forced to retransmit all the data over the 
whole path multiple times. The wireless network resources tend to be 
scarce, hence any additional retransmissions should be avoided. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 2 The Internet architecture design 
 
 
The varying wireless network technologies are depicted in Figure 3 
together with the corresponding IEEE standards.  Only commercially 
available technologies are listed; radio amateur communications, 
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proprietary military communication, and other private communication 
technologies are omitted. The main reason for omitting these other radio 
technologies is the fact that even the military is beginning to deploy 
technologies based on open standards (such as IP) and COTS products, 
hence, the technologies illustrated in the picture are of most interest. 
 
The wireless technologies have been designed for different purposes. 
Wireless Wide Area Networks (WWAN) and Wireless Metropolitan Area 
Networks (WMAN) have been designed to cover large areas and thus 
allow a large degree of mobility. Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) 
provide limited mobility within a small area, such as an office. They have 
mainly been designed to extend the wired local area network by allowing 
the user to connect to the network from anywhere within the coverage 
area. Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPAN) are basically cable 
replacement solutions designed to free the user from the hassle of cables 
when connecting personal devices (e.g. laptops, mobile phones, printers, 
PDAs, and cameras) to each other.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Network technologies 
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The benefits of wireless networking is increased flexibility with respect to 
mobility and coverage of remote areas. However, the wireless medium is 
vulnerable to disturbances due to weather, terrain, hostile activities, and so 
on. One major problem is the bit error rate, which limits the ability to 
transport large amounts of data or to keep sessions alive. Thus, providing 
reliability, security, QoS, etc. is more difficult than in traditional wired 
networks. 
 
3.2.1 Satellite communication 
 
Satellite communication is carried out through communication satellites 
with geostationary, Molniya, or low earth orbits. A satellite in a 
geostationary orbit (GEO)  appears to be in a fixed position to earth. It 
revolves around the earth at a constant speed once per day over the 
equator. However, such satellites are not suitable for providing 
connectivity at high latitudes, because they may appear low or below the 
horizon. The Molniya orbit, mainly used for telecommunications and 
television over Russia, is inclined to guarantee good elevation over the 
northern hemisphere. Molniya orbits have very high apogees at the high 
latitudes where the users desire long duration for communications. A low 
earth orbit (LEO) is a circular orbit of roughly 150km above the surface of 
earth and with a coverage of a radius of 1000 km. The tradeoff between 
geostationary and LEO satellites is that LEOs are less expensive to deploy 
and the required signal strength is lower, however, due to the small 
coverage area, the number of LEO satellites needed is significantly higher. 
 
Satellite communication is mainly used where no other form of 
communication is available, such as remote areas, conflict areas, or war 
zones. For example, Iridium [38] Satellite LLC provides voice and data 
solutions with complete coverage of the earth using several cross-linked 
LEO satellites. Inmarsat [37], on the other hand, provides satellite 
communications over geostationary satellites that cover the whole earth 
except the poles. Typical customers include industries such as maritime, 
aviation, government/military, emergency/humanitarian services, mining, 
forestry, oil and gas, heavy equipment, transportation and utilities. 
 
Satellite communications have several benefits. Satellites provide global 
coverage and are a good solution for one way broadcast applications, as 
one satellite is able to cover a large geographical area. Satellite 
communications are difficult to disrupt, thus providing a reliable means of 
communication. Furthermore, mobility is easily supported. The decrease in 
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cost have made it possible even for individuals to take advantage of 
satellite communications, which is no longer limited to governments, 
military, and large corporations only. 
 
However, satellite communications do not provide support for all wireless 
networking needs that have emerged, especially if two-way high-speed 
communication with short delays is required.  
 
 
3.2.2 Wireless Wide Area Networks 
 
A Wide Area Network (WAN) is a computer network that spans large 
geographical areas and includes a vast number of computers. Perhaps the 
most well known WAN is the Internet. 
 
Wireless Wide Area Network technologies are standardized by IEEE as 
the 802.20, also known as Mobile Broadband Wireless Access (MBWA), 
and by ETSI as the 3GPP standard. Specifications are developed 
cooperatively between IEEE and ETSI to allow MBWA networks to 
interface 3G networks. The MBWA standard is also known by the name 
Mobile-Fi. 
 
The scope of IEEE 802.20 is to develop a specification for the physical 
and medium access control layers of a wireless interface for interoperable 
packet-data mobile broadband wireless access systems that [49]: 
• operates in licensed frequency bands below 3.5GHz 
• supports peak data rates per user in excess of 1 Mbps 
• supports vehicular mobility classes up to 250km/h 
• covers cell sizes commensurate with ubiquitous metropolitan area 
networks 
• targets spectral efficiency, sustained user data rates and numbers 
of active users significantly higher than achieved by existing 
mobile systems. 
 
The purpose of MBWA is to fill the performance gap between the high 
data-rate low mobility services and the high mobility cellular services. It 
supports vehicular mobility and allows users to utilize a wide area network 
through an access network when mobile. Inter-technology roaming and 
handoffs, e.g. from a MBWA network to a WLAN, are also made possible 
e.g. using IEEE 802.21 type of Media Independent handoffs. 
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3.2.3 Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks 
 
A Metropolitan Area Network (MAN) is a large computer network 
spanning e.g. a campus or a city.  
 
WiMax (Worldwide Interoperability of Microwave Access) is a Wireless 
MAN technology defined in the IEEE 802.16 standard and promoted by 
the WiMax forum. WiMax specifies a WMAN protocol that will provide a 
wireless alternative to cable, DSL, and T1 level services. It supports low 
latency applications, such as voice and video, provides broadband 
connectivity, and is able to support thousands of users from a single base 
station. One base station has a cell radius of 50 km. 
 
Three major phases in the development of WiMax are anticipated [32]. In 
the fist phase, WiMax will provide hot spot backhauls and fixed location 
private line services with transmission rates up to 100 Mbps using outdoor 
antennas. In the second phase, WiMax will offer broadband wireless 
access, or wireless DSL, offering data rates between 512 Kbps and 1 
Mbps. Low-cost, indoor, user installable devices that do not have to be 
aligned with the base stations will be installed on the user premises and 
integrated with the radio modem. In the third phase, mobile users traveling 
at speeds up to 120 km/h can be supported. The expected data rate is 512 
Kbps. The use scenarios of all three phases are depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 A WiMax cell 
 
WiMax and MBWA are in a sense competing technologies. While MBWA 
was designed to be a mobile system supporting high mobility speeds, 
mobility is an add-on to the WiMax technology. However, WiMax is 
supported by larger vendors than MBWA and it is expected that WiMax 
products hit the market first. Neither technology aims to compete with Wi-
Fi technologies (see Section 3.2.4.), but rather to complement it. 
 
3.2.4 Wireless Local Area Networks 
 
A Local Area Network (LAN) is a computer network covering a local area, 
such as a company or home network.  
 
Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity) is a Wireless LAN (WLAN) technology defined 
in the IEEE 802.11 standards and promoted by the Wi-Fi forum. Wi-Fi 
was initially developed to add mobility to private wired LANs using the 
unlicensed radio spectrum. The range of WLAN is in the order of 100 m, 
depending on the environment and antennas used. Typically, the 
experienced transmission rate will drop as the distance to the base station 
increases. Transmission rates are specified between 1 Mbps and 108 Mbps. 
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The IEEE 802.11 standard specifies two WLAN modes: infrastructure and 
ad hoc mode. In the infrastructure mode, computers communicate with a 
wireless access point, which typically is connected to a wired network. In 
ad hoc mode, computers may communicate directly in a peer-to-peer 
fashion.  
 
One of the benefits of Wi-Fi is that it is able to provide high speed Internet 
access with low requirements for transmission power. Thus, it is a feasible 
technology even for small, battery driven devices. It also adds flexibility to 
local area networking, as it supports user mobility. Wi-Fi is the most cost-
efficient wireless technology today. The disadvantage is the lack of 
support for QoS, and the lack of privacy protection for users. 
 
Wi-Fi has also been used for services for which it was not originally 
designed. Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISP) established hot spots 
to provide wireless Internet access to users, however, without success. The 
problem was twofold; first, since the range of WLAN is limited to 100m, 
users had to be physically present in the hot spot to be able to access the 
network. Second, the small coverage area limited the options for 
subscription to the service. Users were not willing to pay a monthly fee 
and have geographically limited access, nor has paying a fee per hour 
attracted customer interest. On the contrary, free WLAN access has 
become a way to attract customers e.g. to a café. To solve the problem, 
city wide Wi-Fi mesh networks were established, where handoffs were 
implemented in a proprietary way. This allowed the user to move while 
remaining connected. However, mesh technology and handoff capabilities 
have not been within the scope of the Wi-Fi standard (although handoff 
support is work in progress). Basically, these mesh WLANs attempt to do 
the job for which WiMax will provide the real solution. 
 
3.2.5 Wireless Personal Area Networks 
 
A Personal Area Network (PAN) is a computer network with a small 
coverage area, e.g. around a person.  
 
A Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN) is established using a cable 
replacement technology, such as infrared connections (IrDA) and 
Bluetooth. WPANs are standardized by IEEE 802.15. The 802.15 standard 
specifies WPAN/Bluetooth, coexistence with WLANs, high speed 
connectivity, and low speed connectivity with long battery life. Typically, 
WPANs connect portable and mobile computing devices, such as laptops, 
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PDAs, peripherals, mobile phones, and consumer electronics. The size of 
the network tends to be small, e.g. a Bluetooth PAN (piconet) enables only 
8 active nodes or 255 inactive ones. Ranges are roughly 10m, but  in ideal 
circumstances it is possible to reach 100m. The connection speed offered 
by Bluetooth is 723.1 kbit/s, or 2.1 Mbps with enhanced data rate. 
 
The main benefits of WPANs are that users no longer have the hassle with 
cables, and the devices can be battery driven since the amount of data to 
transfer is small and the range is short, hence resulting in devices that are 
small and inexpensive.   
 
3.3 Mobility management 
 
Traditionally, nodes and networks were fixed, and routing was static. 
However, together with the evolvement of wireless technologies, mobility 
has become a requirement, and thus mobility support had to be added to 
the Internet protocols. 
 
Currently, the IP address functions both as an identifier of the node and an 
interface locator, that is, the address specifies both the identity of the node 
and its current point of attachment to the Internet. When the node changes 
its point of attachment, the address changes. The objective of the mobility 
management schemes is to enable reachability between two 
communicating nodes even when their attachment points to the Internet 
changes. 
 
The main problems that mobility management schemes must solve are the 
following: 
 
1. Locating the mobile node, i.e. finding its current point of 
attachment to the network. 
2. Data transmission to the mobile node. The data has to be 
transferred to the current location of the node.  
3. Continuation of the data transmission after the node or network 
has moved, including addressing the double jump problem, i.e. 
when both communicating parties move simultaneously. 
4. Controlled disconnection. Disconnecting from the network is done 
in such a way that no extra load is enforced on other nodes. 
5. Optimizing performance. Mobility management schemes should 
take performance optimization into consideration, such as network 
load, number of signaling messages, etc.  
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In this thesis, the features mentioned above will be used for comparing the 
various mobility management schemes. 
 
This type of mobility is called terminal mobility, and refers to a situation 
where the network terminal moves from one location or  domain to 
another. In the case of ad hoc networking (described in Section 3.4), the 
terminal may also move within the network boundary. 
 
In addition, also other forms of mobility exist, namely application and 
identity mobility. Application mobility refers to a situation where the 
software process can migrate from one host to another, and thus, move. 
Agent technologies are typical implementations of application mobility. 
Identity mobility refers to a situation where the identity, defined as a name, 
number, or cryptographic key, changes its location (i.e., computer).  
 
In this thesis, only the case of terminal mobility will be considered. 
Terminal mobility can occur on a node level (only the node moves) or on a 
network level (the network moves, but the leaf nodes are not aware of the 
movement). 
 
3.3.1 Node mobility 
 
Node mobility can be divided into three different categories: nano 
mobility, micro mobility, and macro mobility, as depicted in Figure 5. 
 
In the case of nano mobility, the point of attachment (base station, if one 
exists) does not change, only the route to the base station and the other 
network nodes change. Nano mobility is typical of ad hoc networks, as 
will be described in Section 3.4. In Figure 5, nano mobility is depicted by 
the mobile node changing its route to the base station as it moves in the 
network. 
 
Micro mobility refers to mobility within a network domain in such a way 
that the node changes the base station to which it is connected, however, it 
still uses the same network address. In Figure 5, micro mobility is depicted 
by the node moving out of range of its previous base station, thus 
performing a handoff to a new base station. This type of handoff is 
commonly referred to as a horizontal handoff. 
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Figure 5 Mobility categories 
 
Macro mobility refers to mobility between different network domains. In 
Figure 5, macro mobility is depicted by the node moving to a separate 
access network. The node will now receive a care-of address in its new 
network, and packets destined for it will be routed to its current location, 
either directly or via a forwarding agent (e.g. a home agent in Mobile IP 
[68][41]). This type of handoff is commonly referred to as a vertical 
handoff. Macro mobility solutions typically seem to fall into the following 
two categories: 
 
Address translation: An address translation scheme typically deploys an 
agent system in the mobile node's home network. The agent intercepts the 
packets that are destined for the mobile node and forwards the packets to 
the network where the mobile node is currently located. The forwarding 
function can be performed by various means, e.g., tunneling. Address 
translation schemes typically function at the network-layer.  
 
Connection forwarding: Connection forwarding is typically handled in 
the transport-layer. When a mobile node changes its IP address, it 
somehow informs the correspondent host about its new address. The new 
address can be sent e.g. using TCP-options.  
 29 
 
3.3.1.1 Network layer mobility 
 
The advantages of providing mobility at the network layer are extensively 
discussed in [4]. The main advantage is that mobility is transparent to 
protocols and applications running on stationary nodes, and a mobile node 
should appear like any stationary node connected to the network. Mobility 
at the network layer would not alter the functionality in the existing 
network infrastructure. Furthermore, many existing applications and 
protocols above the transport layer assume that the IP address of a node 
never changes during operations. Thus, to support mobility, all these 
applications and protocols would need to be modified unless transparency 
can be provided. In the case of mobility at the network layer, only one 
protocol (namely the IP protocol), needs modification, while transport and 
application layer protocols can remain unchanged. 
 
Mobile IPv4 
 
Mobile IPv4 [68] provides mobility support for nodes using IPv4 [70].  
 
Three entities are defined in Mobile IPv4: the Mobile Node (MN), the 
Home Agent (HA), and the Foreign Agent (FA).  
 
A Mobile Node is a host that changes its point of attachment from one 
network to another. However, regardless of its current location, it is always 
identified by its permanent home address. When the MN is away from 
home, it obtains a care-of address in its visited network. The care-of 
address can either be acquired from a foreign agent through agent 
advertisement messages, or by some external means which the MN 
associates with one of its own network interfaces. In the former case, the 
care-of address is the IP address of the FA. The FA relays the registration 
to the home agent, which then tunnels the packets destined for the MN to 
the FA. The FA detunnels the packets and forwards them to the MN. In the 
latter case, the care-of address may be obtained, for example, through 
DHCP [DHCP]. In this case, the MN functions as its own FA, and 
decapsulates the packets itself. [69].  
 
Mobile originated connections: When the MN is communicating with a 
corresponding node (CN), it first sends the packets to the FA, which either 
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reverse-tunnels them to the HA [58], or forwards them directly to the CN. 
Packets from the CN are routed via the HA to the MN via the FA. 
 
Mobile terminated connections: The CN sends packets to the MN using 
its permanent IP address. The HA tunnels the packets to the FA, which 
forwards them to the MN. 
 
In Table 1, the solutions to the main mobility management problems are 
presented. 
 
Locating the mobile node Packets sent to its fixed IP 
address 
Data transmission to the mobile 
node 
The HA tunnels the packets to the 
FA, which forwards them to the 
MN. 
Continuation of the data 
transmission after the node has 
moved 
The MN sends a location update 
to the HA. Transparent to the 
CN. 
Controlled disconnection The MN deregisters from the FA 
and updates its location to the 
HA.  
Keep-alive messages. 
Optimizing performance Route optimization protocol to 
avoid triangle routing 
Table 1 Summary of mobility solutions in Mobile IPv4 
 
Mobile IPv6 
 
Mobile IPv6 [41] provides routing support to permit a node to continue 
using its permanent IPv6 address [20] regardless of its location. Mobile 
IPv6 relies on the concept developed in Mobile IPv4, however, with some 
changes. 
 
In Figure 6, the Mobile IPv6 architecture is depicted on a conceptual level. 
When a MN enters a visited network (1), it acquires an IP address e.g. by 
stateless address autoconfiguration or Neighbor Discovery, specified in 
IPv6. Thus, no foreign agents are needed. The MN then registers its care-
of address with its home agent (2) by sending a Binding Update (BU). The 
HA responds with a Binding Acknowledgment. For simplicity, the actual 
 31 
signaling is not depicted. When a CN wishes to communicate with the 
MN, it sends the packets to MN's home network (3). The HA then tunnels 
the packets to the MN using MN's care-of address (4). When the MN 
receives the packets, it may send a Binding Update to the CN to provide 
route optimization (5).  
 
 
Figure 6 A conceptual model of Mobile IPv6 
 
Route optimization comes with a disadvantage for the access network. As 
the access network typically is wireless, the significant amount of 
signaling required per CN becomes a problem. [8] 
 
Table 2 summarizes the mobility management solutions in Mobile IPv6. 
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Locating the mobile node Packets sent to its fixed IP 
address. The HA tunnels the 
packets to the MN, which informs 
the CN of its current location. 
Data transmission to the mobile 
node 
First tunneled to HA, then 
directly to MN  
Continuation of the data 
transmission after the node has 
moved 
The MN sends a Binding Update 
to the HA and the CNs. 
Controlled disconnection The MN sends a Binding Update 
to the HA and the CNs. 
Optimizing performance Route optimization part of the 
protocol to avoid triangle routing. 
Table 2 Summary of mobility management solutions in Mobile IPv6 
 
LINA/LIN6 
 
In [39], the Location Independent Network Architecture (LINA) is 
presented as an alternative approach to Internet mobility. As previously 
mentioned, IP addresses function both as an identifier of the node and an 
interface locator. The main concept of LINA is separation of the node 
identifier and the interface locator. The node identifier is assigned to the 
network interface of the node and does not change even if the point of 
attachment changes. The locator uniquely defines the point of attachment. 
It is assigned to the network interface of the node and is used for routing 
purposes.  
 
When an application wishes to communicate with a particular node, it may 
specify the node using either the identifier or the locator. The transport 
layer is responsible for maintaining the connection using either one. In the 
former case, the node identifier must be mapped to its current interface 
locator. This is done by dividing the network layer into two sublayers: the 
identification sublayer and the delivery sublayer. The identification 
sublayer handles the conversion of the identifier to the locator by querying 
a Mapping Agent (MA), and the delivery sublayer delivers the packet. 
Mobility support comes from the fact that the node identifier remains 
unchanged regardless of node movement. In the latter case, where the 
application wishes to communicate using the locator, the identification 
sublayer is bypassed, and the delivery layer takes care of routing the 
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packet. However, if either of the communicating nodes move, the transport 
connection will break. Thus, mobility is not supported in this case. 
 
LIN6 [50] is the protocol based on LINA that provides mobility for IPv6. 
A 64-bit LIN6 ID is used as the node identifier, which in addition to the 
traditional IPv6 address is unique to each node. However, as IPv6 
applications cannot easily use the 64-bit LIN6 ID as node identifiers, a 64-
bit LIN6 prefix is introduced. The prefix is concatenated to the LIN6 ID, 
resulting in a 128-bit LIN6 generalized ID, which has the same format as 
an IPv6 address. The applications communicate with this LIN6 generalized 
ID. 
 
The LIN6 address is used to specify the location of the nodes. A LIN6 
address is constructed from a 64-bit network prefix and the 64-bit LIN6 
ID.  The LIN6 generalized ID has to be mapped with this current locator. 
The Mapping Agent  maintains the mapping information. When the node 
changes its location in the network, it registers its mapping information to 
the specified MA. Also the corresponding nodes need to update the 
mapping. LIN6 provides two ways of updating the mapping [40]: the 
mobile node updates the mapping of the corresponding nodes or the 
mobile node requests the corresponding nodes to request a new mapping 
from the MA.  
 
When a node wishes to contact the destination node known by the LIN6 
generalized ID, it requests the MA of the destination node to return the 
current location of the node. A LIN6 (network level) address is returned. 
 
On the application layer, the LIN6 generalized ID is used. This ID remains 
unchanged when the node moves in the network. Thus, mobility on the 
application layer is guaranteed. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the mobility management solutions in LIN6/LINA. 
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Locating the mobile node Mapping Agent 
Data transmission to the mobile 
node 
Directly 
Continuation of the data 
transmission after the node has 
moved 
1. The MN updates its 
mapping with the MA 
and its peers 
2. The MN updates its 
mapping with the MA 
and requests the peers to 
query the MA. 
Controlled disconnection Updating the MA and the peers 
Optimizing performance No overhead in the protocol 
header. No triangular routing. 
Table 3 Summary of mobility management solutions for LIN6/LINA 
 
3.3.1.2 Transport layer mobility 
 
The favors of providing mobility at the transport layer are discussed in 
[82]. The significant advantage of handling mobility at the transport layer 
instead of at the network layer stems from the fact that network-layer 
mobility comes at significant cost, complexity, and performance 
degradation due to triangle routing. The motivation for providing end-to-
end mobility is to support the different mobility modes of applications, that 
is, applications that originate the connections, and applications to which 
other hosts originate connections to, and to empower the applications to 
make choices best suited to their needs. 
 
SCTP 
 
The Stream Control Transport Protocol (SCTP) [85] is an IETF standard 
providing enhanced TCP like transport service. Even though it is primarily 
designed to provide transport to signaling protocols, e.g., SS7,  it may 
eventually replace TCP [71] and even UDP [72] in some application areas.  
As a primary feature, the SCTP protocol allows the connection endpoints 
to be defined as groups of IP addresses. The basic motivation behind this 
has been the need to provide robustness and load balancing capabilities to 
large multi-homed hosts. To further enhance robustness, a method for 
dynamically adding and removing addresses from the SCTP endpoint 
address sets. [84] The main intention was not to provide mobility support, 
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but rather to allow new network interfaces to be added and old to be 
removed from multi-homed hosts. 
 
In [83], an extension called mobile SCTP (mSCTP) is described. The 
extension can be used to provide seamless handover for mobile nodes 
[74][16]. The handover management is provided at the transport layer, and 
unlike network-layer solutions, do not need to rely on the support of 
network routers and proxies for tunneling. In case of mobile-terminated 
connections, mSCTP must be used along an additional location 
management scheme, such as Mobile IP [41], the Session Initiation 
Protocol (SIP) [33], or Dynamic DNS (DDNS) [93]. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the mobility management solutions in mSCTP. 
 
Locating the mobile node Dynamic DNS/Mobile IP/SIP 
Data transmission to the mobile 
node 
To the specified primary IP 
address 
Continuation of the data 
transmission after the node has 
moved 
Update the IP address set used by 
the peers (and the primary IP 
address) 
Controlled disconnection Update the IP address set used by 
the peers (and the primary IP 
address) 
Optimizing performance - 
Table 4 Summary of mobility management solutions in mSCTP 
 
Multihomed TCP/Extended Transport Control Protocol 
 
In [35], the Multihomed TCP, also known as the Extended Transport 
Control Protocol (ETCP) [95], is described.  The ETCP protocol extends 
the traditional TCP by enabling the nodes to use a set of IP addresses 
instead of just one IP address. Addresses can be dynamically updated 
during the communication. Thus, ETCP supports both multihoming and 
mobility.  
 
The Multihomed TCP draft has expired. 
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Migrate TCP 
 
In [82], a transport-layer mobility scheme is presented. There 
are three major components in this scheme: addressing, mobile node 
location, and connection migration. Addresses are obtained using e.g. the 
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)  [25], or an 
autoconfiguration protocol [87].  
 
Once the mobile node has obtained an address, it may start communicating 
with corresponding nodes. If the mobile node is a client that actively opens 
a connection to the corresponding node, no location task needs to be 
performed. However, if the movement occurs while a connection is open, 
the mobile node will first obtain a new IP address from its new network, 
and the connection continues via a secure negotiation with the 
communicating nodes using a Migrate TCP option. To support mobile 
servers and other applications where nodes residing on the Internet 
originate the communication, DNS is used for locating mobile nodes. 
When the  mobile node changes its point of attachment, it changes its 
hostname-to-address mapping in the DNS by using a secure DNS update 
protocol [26][92]. Nodes wishing to communicate with the mobile node 
make hostname lookups and retrieve the IP address of the mobile node's 
current location.  
 
Connection migration is handled by deploying a Migrate TCP option, 
included in SYN segments, that identifies a SYN packet as part of a 
previously established connection rather than a request for a new one. The 
mobile node restarts previously established TCP 
connections from its new address by sending the Migrate SYN packet that 
identifies the previous connection; the corresponding node then 
resynchronizes the connection with the mobile node. To secure the 
migration from hijacking attacks, the end nodes may either rely on 
solutions such as IPSec [44], or use an unguessable connection token 
which is negotiated using a secret connection key. 
 
The scheme does not present a solution to the double jump problem. 
 
Table 5 summarizes the mobility management solutions in Migrate TCP. 
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Locating the mobile node DNS 
Data transmission to the mobile 
node 
Directly 
Continuation of the data 
transmission after the node has 
moved 
Migrate TCP + resynchronization 
of the session 
Controlled disconnection DNS update 
Optimizing performance - 
Table 5 The mobility management solutions in Migrate TCP 
 
3.3.1.3 Application layer mobility 
 
The main motivation for providing mobility at the application layer is that 
no changes to the operating system are required. Thus, it is believed that 
mobility can be more easily deployed widely. 
 
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [33] has often been suggested as a 
protocol for providing mobility at the application layer. SIP supports 
personal mobility, and adding node mobility is easy according to [79]. The 
paper presents one approach of using SIP for node mobility. 
 
The basic purpose of SIP is to allow two or more nodes to establish a 
session consisting of multiple media streams. There are three entities in 
SIP: user agents, proxy servers, and redirect servers. A user agent is 
denoted by an email-like address, e.g. user@domain. The purpose of the 
user agent is to listen to incoming connections and to send SIP messages 
based on user actions or incoming messages.  It also starts the right 
application depending on the established session. The proxy server relays 
messages so that it is possible to use a domain name to locate a user 
without having to know the IP address or the name of the user's terminal. 
This feature also provides location privacy to the user. The redirect server 
returns the location of the host rather than relaying SIP messages. This 
provides scalability, as the redirect server only needs to send the location 
of the terminal as a response rather than participating in the whole 
transaction. Identity mobility is provided by the fact that a user can register 
his current location, regardless of which terminal he used,  with the proxy 
or redirect servers, which will then redirect the traffic to the new 
destination. 
 
 38 
To add node mobility, roaming frequency and the ability to change IP 
address during a traffic flow must be supported. Roaming support is 
provided in a similar way as in e.g. Mobile IP. Each mobile node has a 
home network, although, unlike in Mobile IP, the mobile node does not 
need to have a static IP address. When the mobile node moves, it registers 
its new location to a SIP server in its home network. To allow sessions to 
continue when moving, the mobile node sends a location update to its 
corresponding nodes informing them of the current IP address used. This 
resembles the Binding Update function of Mobile IPv6.  
 
Table 6 summarizes the mobility management solutions in SIP. 
 
Locating the mobile node User domain or IP address 
Data transmission to the mobile 
node 
Directly or via proxy agent 
Continuation of the data 
transmission after the node has 
moved 
Location update to SIP server 
and peers 
Controlled disconnection Location update to SIP server 
and peers 
Optimizing performance - 
Table 6 Mobility management solutions in SIP 
 
3.3.1.4 Hybrid approaches 
 
Hybrid mobility schemes typically provide mobility between the network 
and transport layer, thus trying to combine the advantages of both 
approaches. 
 
Homeless Mobile IP 
 
Homeless Mobile IP is a connection forwarding scheme working at the 
network layer, or at the border between the network layer and the transport 
layer [65]. A new data structure is added between the IP layer and the 
upper layers. The new layer represents each node with a dynamically 
changing set of IP addresses. Thus, in principle, the solution is pretty 
similar to many of the transport layer connection forwarding schemes. 
However, by placing the functionality in the network layer, it makes the 
mechanisms available to all upper layer protocols, and it also allows the 
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addresses to be shared between multiple transport protocols and multiple 
connections, thereby saving memory and potentially reducing the need for 
signaling traffic. 
 
In the Homeless Mobile IP architecture, the fixed IP addresses are more or 
less abandoned, except perhaps for some root DNS servers or heavily 
trafficed web servers. All nodes are assumed to have dynamic IP 
addresses, that is, the IP layer makes no distinction between a dynamically 
assigned IP address or a fixed one. The concept of a Home Agent is 
abandoned altogether. 
 
Connections may be mobile originated or mobile terminated: 
 
Mobile originated connections: When a host wishes to establish a 
connection e.g. to a server, it requests the IP address(es) of the server from 
DNS and creates a foreign Host Cache entry based on the response.  When 
the node initiates communication, it must select one of the addresses to be 
used as a destination address. The choice is made based on some specified 
policy. For example, the policy may state that the destination address to be 
used shall be the last address that the corresponding node used as a source 
address. Another possible policy would be to use the fattest pipe, that is, 
the destination address corresponding to the link with the highest speed.  
The selection may also be made on packet basis. This may be beneficial; 
for example, this can be used for load balancing between links, or selecting 
the link based on some Quality-of-Service policy or other properties. Once 
the destination address is selected, the source address may be selected 
among the ones available at the local Host Cache Entry, for example, using 
the source address selection algorithm in [24]. 
 
If the node roams during the connection, it must inform the corresponding 
host about the change of point of attachment. This is done by updating its 
Host Cache entry at the corresponding host.  
 
Mobile terminated connections: Mobile hosts functioning as servers 
need a way to announce their current location to the outside world. One 
possible way  would be to make use of dynamic DNS [93]. When the host 
changes its point of attachment, it updates its name-to-address entries in 
the DNS in a similar fashion as in the transport-layer solution presented by 
[82]. A host originating a connection will thus find the host by querying 
the DNS, which returns one or more addresses through which the host can 
be currently reached. The connection originating host then creates a Host 
Cache entry corresponding to the DNS replies and uses one of the 
addresses according to its policy. 
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The major drawback of using Dynamic DNS is, however, that it does not 
support fast handoffs where the host changes its address. However, it is 
assumed that a host does not change its point of attachment to the Internet 
more frequently than a few times a minute, in which case the scheme 
works fine. This assumption is made by several other mobility schemes as 
well and seems to be feasible in most cases. However, Homeless Mobile 
IP is by no means restricted to Dynamic DNS; other mechanisms, such as 
SIP [33], may be deployed instead.  
 
The double jump problem is not properly addressed in Homeless Mobile 
IP. However, the standard Mobile IPv6 [41] specifies a mechanism where 
a mobile host arranges a home agent at the old location to temporarily 
forward packets to its new location. Homeless Mobile IP could use a 
mechanism similar to the one in standard Mobile IPv6, however, instead of 
a home agent, a forwarding agent would be used. The purpose of these 
agents would be to temporarily forward packets. When the node moves to 
another network, it will register its new address to the forwarding agent, 
which for a short period of time (e.g. 15 seconds) will forward the packets 
to the node. The forwarding request is authenticated in order to prevent 
illegitimate requests.  
 
Table 7 summarizes the mobility management solutions in Homeless 
Mobile IP. 
 
 
Locating the mobile node Dynamic DNS (or other 
repository) 
Data transmission to the mobile 
node 
Directly 
Continuation of the data 
transmission after the node has 
moved 
Update Host Cache Entries of 
CNs 
DNS update 
Controlled disconnection DNS and CN updates, temporary 
forwarding agents 
Optimizing performance - 
Table 7 Summary of the mobility management solutions in Homeless Mobile 
IP 
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The Host Identity Payload/Protocol (HIP) 
 
There are two name spaces in use in the Internet today: IP addresses and 
domain names. The three main problems with the current name spaces are 
that dynamic readdressing cannot be directly managed, anonymity is not 
provided in a consistent and trustable manner, and authentication for 
systems and datagrams is not provided. The Host Identity 
Payload/Protocol (HIP) architecture [59][60][61] introduces a new 
cryptographic name space, the Host Identity (HI), and adds a Host Layer 
between the network and the transport layer in the IP stack. 
 
The modification to the IP stack is depicted in Figure 7. In the current 
architecture, each process is identified by a process ID (PID). The process 
may establish transport layer connections to other hosts (or to the host 
itself), and the transport layer connection is then identified using the 
source and destination IP addresses as well as the source and destination 
ports. On the IP layer, the IP address is used as the endpoint identifier, and 
on the MAC layer, the hardware address is used. In HIP, the transport 
layer is modified so that the connections are identified using the source 
and destination HIs as well as the source and destination ports. HIP then 
provides a binding between the HIs and the IP addresses, e.g. using DNS 
[57]. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 The traditional stack compared to the HIP stack 
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The HI is typically a cryptographic public key, which serves as the 
endpoint identifier of the node. Each host will have at least one HI 
assigned to its networking kernel or stack. The HI can be either public or 
anonymous. Public HIs may be stored in directories, such as DNS, in order 
to allow the host to be contacted by other hosts. 
 
The HI is never directly used in any Internet protocol. It is stored in a 
repository, and is passed in HIP. Protocols use a 128-bit Host Identity Tag 
(HIT), which is a hash of the HI. Another representation of the HI is the 
Local Scope Identity (LSI), which has a size of 32 bits, but is local to the 
host. Its main purpose is to support backwards compatibility with the IPv4 
API. 
 
The main advantages of using HIT in protocols instead of the HI is that its 
fixed length makes protocol coding easier and also does not add as much 
overhead to the data packets as a public key would. It also presents a 
consistent format to the protocol regardless of the underlying identity 
technology used. HIT functions much like the SPI does in IPsec, but 
instead of being an arbitrary 32-bit value that identifies the Security 
Association for a datagram (together with the destination IP address and 
security protocol), HIT identifies the public key that can validate the 
packet authentication. 
 
The HIP architecture basically solves the problems of dynamic 
readdressing, anonymity, and authentication. As the IP address no longer 
functions as an endpoint identifier, the problem of mobility becomes 
trivial, as the node may easily change its HI and IP address bindings as it 
moves.  Furthermore, as the name space is cryptographically based, it 
becomes possible to perform authentication based on the HIs. HIP mobility 
is described in [54]. In [66], the concept of integrating security, mobility, 
and multi-homing based on HIP is discussed further. 
 
Table 8 summarizes the mobility management solutions in HIP. 
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Locating the mobile node DNS or other repository 
Data transmission to the mobile 
node 
Directly 
Continuation of the data 
transmission after the node has 
moved 
Update HI&IP binding at DNS; 
send update to peers 
Controlled disconnection Update HI&IP bindings 
Optimizing performance Temporary forwarding agents 
Table 8 Summary of the mobility management solutions in HIP 
 
3.3.1.5 Summary of mobility management schemes 
 
Several proposals for mobility management exist. Network layer schemes 
attempt to make mobility transparent to protocols and applications so that 
no modifications are needed on layer above IP. Transport layer schemes 
motivate their existence with the claim that network layer mobility comes 
with significant cost, complexity, and performance degradation due to 
triangle routing. Application layer schemes provide simplicity for 
operating system design, as no changes to the operating systems are 
needed. Also hybrid schemes exist, where features from both network and 
transport layer schemes are adopted. 
 
All schemes come with good performance when the network is static and 
node mobility is infrequent. However, in very dynamic networks all 
schemes perform badly, as signaling lags behind. This has a direct affect 
on reachability. Almost all schemes use some sort of anchoring point to 
ensure reachability, such as a Home Agent, Mapping Agent, DDNS, or 
(temporary) forwarding agents. One of the major problems is the double 
jump problem, which none of the schemes have been able to solve in a 
reasonable way. As fast mobility is poorly supported already when one 
node is moving, the problem gets worse when both nodes are moving. In 
Figure 8, the double jump problem is illustrated when both nodes move 
rapidly and use forwarding agents. For simplicity, the complete signaling 
is not depicted, only the first location update message. Node A and B both 
move and change their point of attachment. We assume that they have 
managed to make a location update to their first access network 
successfully, and only after that begin to move rapidly. When A is in 
access network 2, it sends an update to the first access network of B. 
However, B has already moved ahead, and has also sent an update to the 
first network of A. The forwarding agents in both networks forward the 
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updates to the second access network. However, A and B have already 
moved ahead, so the forwarding agents in the second network forward the 
packets to the third network. The first update message from A reaches B in 
its third access network, so node B starts to send packets to the second 
access network of A, where the forwarding agent forwards the packets to 
the third network. At this  point, node A has already moved ahead. This 
goes on until at least one node stops moving or the packets no longer have 
time to reach the nodes, at which point the connection breaks. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 The problem with double jump signaling 
 
If anchoring points such as Home Agents were used in the scenario above, 
it would be much easier to ensure continuous communication. 
 
All schemes are also vulnerable to attacks. The obvious ways of attacking 
mobility management is to attack the anchoring points or the signaling 
traffic. As there are significantly fewer anchoring points than mobile 
nodes, targeting them would break mobility management and disable the 
nodes' roaming capabilities. It is also easier to eliminate the anchoring 
points than all the mobile nodes, especially since the anchoring points are 
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static. As for signaling, it is not sufficient to encrypt the packets to protect 
mobility management messages, since it is possible to deduce from the 
packet length that the message is, for example, a binding update. 
 
3.3.2 Network mobility 
 
Network mobility is concerned with managing the mobility of an entire 
network that is changing its point of attachment to the fixed infrastructure 
and thus its reachability in the network topology. To support network 
mobility, at least one mobile router(MR) is required to connect the 
network to the infrastructure. It is also possible to provide multihoming by 
allowing the MR to have multiple attachments to the infrastructure, or by 
introducing a separate MR for the various points of attachment. Each MR 
has a Home Agent (HA), and bidirectional tunneling between the MR and 
the HA is used to preserve session continuity when the network moves. 
While moving, the MR acquires a care-of address from its new attachment 
point in the same way as mobile nodes using Mobile IP do when they 
roam. Thus, mobile networks can be nested, as each MR will appear to its 
attachment point as a single node. The mobile network nodes (MNNs) are 
also unaware of the mobility of the network. MNNs may be fixed or 
mobile. 
 
Figure 9 Network mobility 
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In Figure 9, a network mobility scenario is depicted. The CN and MNN 
communicate while the network of MNN moves. The movement is 
transparent to both CN and MNN.  
 
Possible applications for network mobility include public transportation, 
such as trains and buses, where each train or bus provides a MR for 
customers to connect to the Internet, cars with low-power sensors 
seamlessly connected to the Internet, in-flight networking, and various 
military scenarios. 
 
3.4 Ad hoc networks 
 
An ad hoc network is a collection of nodes that do not need to rely on a 
predefined infrastructure to establish and maintain communications [9]. 
Most or all nodes participate in network operations, such as routing and 
network management, depending on their capacity with respect to CPU, 
memory, and energy level. Nodes are typically able to move within the 
network, and they may enter and leave the network on frequent basis. 
Thus, ad hoc networks are most likely wireless, although some nodes may 
have connections to a wired infrastructure as well.  
 
The predecessors of mobile ad hoc networking technologies were the 
DARPA Packet Radio Networks and the Survivable Adaptive Networks 
(SURAN) programs in the 1970s and 1980s, which were sponsored by the 
U.S. government and primarily aimed at military purposes. The problem 
with traditional military networking was the time needed to establish the 
network; when the network was operational, the forces had already moved 
ahead. To solve the problem, ad hoc networks were designed to be 
established on the fly (zero configuration) where and when needed. In 
[75], future tactical information systems based on commercial, non-
developmental standards, and equipment is discussed in further detail. 
 
Ad hoc networks are faced with several challenges, especially in the 
military case, where the environment is hostile due to the existence of at 
least one enemy, and harsh due to weather conditions, terrain, EMI, and so 
on. Military battlefield networks tend to be heterogeneous, including 
everything from tiny sensors to powerful computers. Communication is 
both wired and wireless depending on the situation, and some nodes are 
able to support several access technologies simultaneously. Nodes may 
also be mobile with various speeds: a node on a human soldier is able to 
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move at roughly 6 km/h, a node in a tank at roughly 30 km/h, and a node 
in a jet fighter at over 1000-2000 km/h. Some nodes, such as sensors, are 
likely not to move at all. Hence, several mobility management schemes 
and access technologies are needed to support all of the mobility 
requirements. Also issues such as QoS, security, reliability, and robustness 
must be addressed for the network to be useful. 
 
The problem with ad hoc networking today is that most of the research has 
been focused on the development of routing protocols, each only 
marginally better than the others depending on the simulation 
environment. Hence, despite almost 50 years of research, the field is 
immature and no real implemented solutions exist. Many relevant topics 
have been ignored, such as security, which has been thought of as an add-
on feature, thus resulting in each ad hoc network routing protocol 
implementing its own security solution. Closely related to security is 
privacy; network traffic reveals the location of the nodes and thus the 
structure of the network as well as other information about the forces. QoS 
issues have not been properly addressed either, and it is often neglected 
that security is a requirement for QoS provisioning. As long as important 
areas of ad hoc networking continue to be neglected, ad hoc networks will 
remain only a theoretical solution for battlefield networks. 
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4 Decision making and the OODA loop 
 
The OODA loop was developed by Colonel John Boyd (ret.) from the US 
Air Force as a continuation of his work on a fast-transient brief, which was 
an application of a learning theory he had developed in "Destruction and 
Creation" report [5] to an operational issue. The fast transient theory 
suggests that in order to win a battle, one must operate in a faster tempo 
than the enemy. Boyd uses as examples Germany's Blitzkrieg against the 
Maginot mentality of France in 1940, the USAF fighter craft F-86 vs. the 
MiG-15 in the Korean war, and the Israeli raid in 1976. The crucial factor 
in the victory of these battles was the ability to transition rapidly from one 
maneuver to another. The basic idea was to operate at a quicker tempo, not 
just moving faster, than the enemy. By generating a rapidly changing 
environment, i.e. acting so quickly that it is confusing and disorienting and 
appears ambiguous and uncertain to the enemy, it is possible to create 
confusion that causes the enemy to overreact or under-react. The 
conclusion is that whoever can handle the quickest rate of change is the 
survivor. The fast-transient briefing held in 1976 was the beginning of his 
time-based theory of conflict, which introduced the concept of the OODA 
loop [6]. 
 
It is a common misconception that the OODA loop was primarily 
developed for the U.S. Air Force and that it merely describes the process 
through which air force pilots determine their split second moves to ensure 
that they are always on target. Although Colonel Boyd originally was a 
fighter pilot, he worked on his time-based theory of conflict only after 
retirement, having then grown interested in ground warfare. The "Patterns 
of Conflict” [6] is a result of several years of study of Sun Tzu, 
Clausewitz, Musashi and the history of warfare, beginning from the 
earliest Greek and Persian battles and continuing with Alexander the Great 
around 300 B.C., Hannibal around 200 B.C., Belisarius around 500 A.D., 
Genghis Khan around 1200 A.D., Tamerlane around 1400 A.D., Napoleon, 
and the First and Second World Wars. Most of his attention was spent on 
general theories of war, the Blitzkrieg concept, guerrilla warfare, and the 
use of deception by great commanders. Many of the ideas presented in 
"Patterns of Conflict" are, in fact, based on ideas learnt from history, and 
especially the thinking of Sun Tzu [86] and Musashi [62]. For example, 
tactics based on deception, speed, fluidity of action, and exploitation of the 
enemy's weaknesses in order to confuse and disorient the enemy is 
emphasized, and it is noted that inferior forces have throughout history 
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been able to win in battle if they have been able to avoid war of attrition. 
[17] 
 
As a product of "Patterns of Conflict", the OODA loop describes a model 
for human decision making. According to Boyd, decision-making follows 
a rational series of steps. Initially, the environment is scanned for data 
(observation). Based on this intelligence, a mental image of the 
surroundings within which the decision is to be made is created 
(orientation). The decision is then made (decision) and carried out (act). 
The goal of conflict is to have a faster OODA loop than the adversary. In 
practice, one should attempt to reduce the time to go through one's own 
OODA loop while trying to increase the time it takes for the enemy to go 
through his. However, the speed is not the most important element of the 
cycle. The important thing is to execute the cycle in such a way as to get 
inside the mind and the decision cycle of the adversary. The ideas of 
creating confusion and disorientation are used here to prevent the enemy 
from functioning.  
 
The basic OODA loop is depicted in Figure 10. OODA is an abbreviation 
of Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. In the observation phase, a person 
collects information from the environment, which he processes in the 
orientation phase. Based on the result of that process, he comes up with 
some alternatives for actions, makes the decision, and acts upon it.   
 
 
Figure 10 The OODA loop 
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Although the OODA loop looks like a simple and linear process, it is not. 
A more detailed version of the OODA loop is depicted in Figure 11. As 
can be seen from the figure, the OODA loop is not a one-dimensional loop. 
Over thirty arrows are drawn to connect the various elements, thus 
yielding the possibilities of several different loops to be derived. The 
"implicit guidance and control" arrows from the orientation phase are 
directed both back to the observation phase and directly to the action 
phase. This describes a situation where one has developed a proper 
understanding of the changing environment and is then able to bypass the 
orientation and decision phases by observing and acting almost 
simultaneously. In this way, it is possible to compress time, i.e. the time it 
takes from making an observation to acting. This temporal discrepancy can 
be used to select the least expected action rather than what is predicted to 
be the most effective action. This causes disorientation to the enemy, 
forcing him to pause, thus stretching the time of the enemy. The enemy is 
more and more delayed in making accurate decisions, and eventually it is 
defeated.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 A more detailed picture of the OODA loop 
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The main stages of the OODA loop are described as follows: 
 
Observation: the first phase of the loop is observation. It is the act of 
becoming aware through careful and directed attention. In the observation 
phase, information about the environment is collected. 
 
Orientation: After information has been collected, it is processed further. 
The human brain forms a mental image of the environment. However, the 
mental image is also dependent on personal characteristics, such as 
experience, culture, genetic heritage, and personality. As can be seen from 
the picture, there are two ways to manipulate information retrieved by 
observation: analysis and synthesis. Analysis breaks down observed events 
into individual components and interactions, and makes deductions that 
lead to understanding. Synthesis, on the other hand, takes several unrelated 
components and forms them into a new whole. 
 
The orientation phase shapes observation, decision, and action, and is itself 
shaped by the feedback from the observation phase. It is the most crucial 
phase in the OODA loop. The speed and accuracy of creating mental 
images affects the probability to survive in a complex situation of conflict.  
 
In [81], five mental blocks affecting the success of the orientation phase 
are described: 
 
1. People require a different level of detail to perceive an event 
 
2. People require 3-5 occurrences of the event before they recognize 
it 
 
3. The existence of preconceived notions where information which 
does not conform to one's own view is given less priority or 
ignored 
 
4. Good news is reported quickly whereas bad news is withheld as 
long as its holder can affect (change) the outcome 
 
5. Communication problems, that is, the message received may not 
be  identical to the one sent.  
 
Once these five problems have been overcome, the process can continue 
into the decision phase.  
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Decision: In the decision phase, the information from the orientation phase 
is analyzed and various options of action are formed. The options are 
considered to the extent possible by time, and a choice is made. The 
amount of available information varies, however, a minimum amount of 
information is required to make a decision. When the minimum amount of 
correct information has been acquired, an opportunity exists to make a 
decision. Information gathering beyond this point is useless or even 
harmful, as the opportunity can be lost and the conflict can evolve. Thus, 
the decision should be made as soon as the minimum amount of 
information is available. 
 
Action: In the last phase, the decision is implemented. It leads to 
unfolding interaction with the environment, which can be observed in the 
observation phase later on in the OODA cycle. 
 53 
 
5 Decision making in a network-centric environment 
 
The key to prevail in a conflict is the cognitive process of the decision 
maker. In [77], information warfare is analyzed according to the OODA 
loop. According to it, information warfare is predominantly concerned 
with denying the enemy the time needed to adapt to warfare situations. 
This is done by creating and perpetuating a highly fluid and menacing state 
of affairs and by disrupting the enemy's ability to adjust to the situation 
[27]. In Clausewitzian terms, the purpose is to create wartime friction and 
fog [15]. Wartime friction is the "countless minor incidents - the one you 
can never really foresee - combined to lower the general level of 
performance, so that one always falls short of the intended goal". 
Typically, the friction of war results from the physical environment, such 
as weather conditions, terrain, or degraded command and control, or from 
psychological factors, such as stress, fear, and chaos. The fog of war refers 
to the concept of uncertainty. Uncertainty stems from incomplete or 
contradictory information, chance actions of the enemy, deviation in 
weapon system efficacy, and the enemy's nebulous capabilities and 
intentions [21]. Fog and friction can be altered to affect the tempo of 
operations. In a conflict, both parties try to accomplish this task 
simultaneously. 
 
 
Figure 12 Interaction between a human and the network-centric environment 
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In a network-centric environment, decision making can be either human or 
computer based. In Figure 12, the decision making process of a human 
(commander) operating in a network-centric environment is depicted. The 
commander takes inputs from the environment through his own 
observations, from other people, and from the network. These observations 
are fed into his OODA loop.  
 
The decision made by the commander will be fed back out to the 
environment and an action will be taken.  
 
The network may change its structure as a result of the decision, for 
example, the forces may move into a new direction with the result that the 
network nodes change their location. To cope with frequent changes, the 
network nodes must themselves be able to make decisions regarding the 
functionality of the network. The computer based decision making process 
can be described using the OODA loop as well, however, the way a node 
goes through its OODA loop is based on a given policy, and the actions 
taken are always based on a set of rules.  
 
 
Figure 13 Interaction between a network node and the network-centric 
environment 
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In Figure 13, the decision making process of a network node is depicted. 
The node collects observations from its environment, for example, from 
other nodes and sensors. The network node will act upon these 
observations by changing its mode of operation if the environment requires 
it to behave differently. For example, if the node finds itself in an 
environment where all other nodes use a different ad hoc routing 
algorithm, it will switch to the new algorithm in order to participate in 
routing. The network management system functions as a global authority, 
and may provide nodes with observations or a new policy. Furthermore, 
the human user may interfere with the decision making process.  
 
The OODA loop in the case of a network node is less complex than that of 
a human being, especially with respect to the orientation and decision 
phases. In the orientation phase, the node has a certain rule-based policy 
that will state how the observations should be handled. When an image of 
the observations has been created, the policy also states what sort of 
decision should be made. The action carries out the decision, and the node 
starts to operate in its new mode. 
 
To ensure the accuracy of the decision making process, both from the point 
of view of the human commander and the network node, it is crucial that 
the network is not vulnerable to "friction and fog".  In Figure 14, the 
relationship between the network-centric environment and the OODA loop 
is depicted. To cause friction and fog to the enemy, or to protect one's own 
process, the decision and action phases are the ones that can be directly 
targeted through the network. In the observation phase, the commanders 
and the network nodes collect data from the environment. From an 
offensive point of view, it is possible to destroy, modify, delay, or falsify 
data to be collected, and thus affect the input to the orientation phase and 
in the end, the decision to be made. In the action phase, where the decision 
is carried out, it is possible to disrupt the action by disrupting the 
communications in various ways, such as jamming the network, delaying 
packets, modifying packets, or inject erroneous packets into the network. 
Furthermore, it is also possible to collect intelligence by merely observing 
the network behaviour.  
 
The orientation and decision phases cannot be directly targeted through the 
network; from a network-centric perspective they merely depend on the 
input that is fed to them from the network. From the point of view of 
information warfare, however, these phases can be directly targeted by 
psychological means. For example, propaganda can affect the way people 
go through their orientation phase and thus make decisions. Psychological 
means are, however, out of scope of this thesis. 
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Figure 14 The OODA loop from a network-centric environment 
 
The main purpose of the network is to function as a tool for leadership. It 
enables people to communicate regardless of location, thus eliminating the 
factor of place and time that has earlier constrained the forces to a small 
geographical area. Furthermore, together with modern information 
technology, it is possible to collect, process, and distribute information 
efficiently, and thus achieve real-time situation awareness. However, from 
the point of view of the network, its main task is to deliver the right IP 
packets to the right place(s) in time and intact, and without violating any 
specified privacy policy.  
 
This has several implications with regards to security. The right packets 
means that only legitimate traffic may be routed in the network, that is, 
packets sent by legitimate nodes that do not show any signs of 
misbehavior. The packets that are routed should arrive at their destination 
without having been illegitimately modified on the way, that is, their 
integrity should be intact. To ensure that packets arrive at the right place in 
time it is crucial that the routing infrastructure is sound. Only legitimate 
nodes may participate in routing. If a legitimate node becomes 
compromised, it should no longer be allowed to participate in network 
operations.  
 
The signaling traffic between nodes must be verifiable to protect the 
routing tables from corruption. Furthermore, denial-of-service attacks 
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should be prevented in order to minimize delays caused by congestion or, 
in the worst case, a complete collapse of the infrastructure. Privacy 
protection is crucial, as the network always leaks information, such as the 
structure of the network, the location of important nodes (e.g. those 
belonging to the commanders), the intent of the forces, the level of training 
of the forces, and so on. However, complete privacy protection is 
extremely difficult in a wireless environment.  
 
Future military systems will be based on a network of heterogeneous 
networks, such as sensor networks, tactical battlefield networks (e.g. ad 
hoc networks), wired and wireless access networks, fixed and temporary 
backbone networks, and so on. An example scenario is depicted in Figure 
15. The ad hoc networks connect to the fixed network via wireless access 
networks whenever they are in the coverage area of a wireless access 
point. All access technologies do not cover all areas, so the most suitable 
alternative is chosen depending on the situation and location.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 A conceptual model of the network architecture 
 
For example, the ad hoc network can be connected via satellite 
communications if it is located in a remote area where no other options are 
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available or when reliability is required. Mobile nodes that are not part of 
an ad hoc network but roam around may use the routing services of 
available ad hoc networks to connect to the fixed infrastructure.  
 
However, these mobile nodes do not themselves participate in network 
operations, such as routing and network management. The wireless access 
networks, in turn, can be fixed or temporary. Their main task is to provide 
connectivity between mobile nodes or networks and the fixed 
infrastructure. The fixed backbone network may also be temporary in the 
sense that it is built for the purpose of connecting the various mobile 
nodes, access networks, and ad hoc networks during some military 
operations, however, the structure of the network will not significantly 
change over time. Servers such as anchoring points for mobility 
management schemes, information databases, etc. are typically placed in 
the fixed infrastructure.  
 
When using the network for human decision making, and when decisions 
regarding the functionality of the network are made by computers, it is 
crucial to secure the decision making process. The observation phase must 
be protected so that only correct and timely data is collected. The action 
phase, in turn, must be protected so that the network supports the actions to 
be taken. 
 
5.1 Security in a network-centric environment 
 
Security can be divided into three layers as depicted in Figure 16. Content 
security refers to protecting the content between the two communicating 
peers, i.e. the end users. The user may be a human being or a computer 
process.  Typically the information is protected from disclosure and 
modification. Furthermore, the end users must be able to verify the source 
of the information. Communication security refers to protecting the data 
that is sent from source to destination over the network.  
 
The endpoints in this case are the computer nodes, however, a computer 
node may have several end users (people or processes). This is the main 
distinction between content and communication security; in the former 
case, the endpoints are the true endpoints of the data transmission, in the 
latter case, the endpoints are the computers sending and receiving the data. 
The communicating nodes must be able to verify the legitimacy of each 
other prior to communication. Furthermore, the data must be protected 
from disclosure, modification, delays, and so on. Network security refers to 
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the security of the network itself, that is, the network must be secured so 
that it is able to perform its tasks of routing the right packets to the right 
place intact and in time without violating specified privacy policies. This 
level of security differs from the two others in the sense that it is not 
concerned with the actual content but rather with how to transfer the 
content from source to destination.   
 
 
Figure 16 Three levels of security 
 
An example of a content security solution is PGP, which was created as a 
public-key encryption system for protecting e.g. email. PGP offers user 
authentication (the recipient can verify that the message was sent by the 
claimed person), encryption, non-repudiation (the sender cannot deny 
having sent the message), and integrity protection (the recipient can verify 
that the message has not been illegitimately modified).  
 
Communication security solutions include protocols such as IPSec [44], 
TLS [23], and SSH. IPSec is a protocol framework for protecting IP 
traffic. TLS is a transport layer security solution for protecting the 
communication between a client and a server, for example, bank 
connections between a home user and the bank. Also HTTP [31], POP3 
[63], IMAP [18], and SMTP [48] use TLS for security. SSH provides 
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secure remote shell connections. It is also possible to use SSH for secure 
tunneling of applications. 
 
The IPSec framework consists of the following protocols: the 
Authentication Header (AH)[45], the Encapsulated Security Payload 
(ESP)[46], IP payload compression [76], and the Internet Key Exchange 
(IKE) protocol[34]. AH provides data authentication and integrity 
protection of the packet, excluding the headers. ESP offers data 
authentication, integrity protection over the whole packet, and encryption. 
IP payload compression is used to compress the data before encryption. 
IKE is used for key exchange and establishment of security associations 
between nodes. IPSec provides security on the network layer and is thus 
transparent to upper layer protocols. 
 
Network security takes several aspects into consideration. One of the key 
issues is availability. Physical security is concerned with protecting the 
cables and network nodes, such as routers, by various access control 
mechanisms. Link level security is concerned with the protection of the 
links between two nodes. The purpose of link level security in a wireless 
network is to provide the same security as cables do in a wired network. 
Typically, link level security includes authentication and encryption. In 
addition, the signaling protocols used in the network must be secured to 
prevent an enemy from, for example, changing the routing structure or 
affecting network management. Also filtering techniques can be used 
restrict or limit network traffic.  
 
5.2 Attack scenarios on the infrastructure 
 
The infrastructure can be attacked in various ways.  
 
Although the attack scenarios are in a military environment, most of them  
are relevant in civilian networks as well. 
 
5.2.1 Attacking the infrastructure 
 
Attacking the infrastructure can either be done externally or internally. In 
the former case, an illegitimate node is able to penetrate the network and 
masquerade as a legitimate node. In the latter case, a legitimate node is 
compromised, i.e. taken over by the enemy, and is then used to attack the 
network. Internal attacks are discussed further in Section 5.2.3.  
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If a node is able to masquerade as a legitimate node, it is able to perform a 
variety of attacks, such as: 
 
• Denial-of-service attacks: the node is able to consume network 
resources by flooding. This is especially severe in wireless ad hoc 
networks where network resources are scarce and the network 
nodes have limited power resources. 
• Disrupting protocol signaling: the node is able to take part in 
protocol signaling, and can thus e.g. change the routing 
infrastructure. 
• Disrupting network traffic: the node is able to drop or delay 
packets. This affects the function of upper layer protocols, causes 
unnecessary signaling traffic in the networks, and eventually 
disrupts the whole network. 
• Traffic analysis: the node is able to spy on network traffic and 
deduce the network structure, location of crucial nodes, and so on. 
• Spreading disinformation: the node is able to spread 
disinformation in the network. For example, a node may act as a 
sensor and feed erroneous data into a data fusion process that 
attempts to create an image of the environment. 
 
In Figure 17, an attack scenario with two enemy nodes, E1 and E2, is 
depicted. Node E1 masquerades as a legitimate node and provides a server 
with disinformation. The server collects data from various sources and 
composes an image of the environment through data fusion. However, 
since some of the data is erroneous, the final image will be misleading. 
This misleading image is distributed in the network, and may eventually 
lead to a commander making wrong decisions based on wrong situational 
awareness. 
 
Node E2, on the other hand, launches some denial-of-service attacks on the 
medium. When receiving packets from the server, it duplicates the packets 
and forwards them to the following node. The denial-of-service attack 
propagates all the way to the destination, which notices the duplicate 
packets, and discards them. If the network medium is wireless, this attack 
is especially severe, since all nodes in the neighborhood of E2 and the ones 
on the path from E2 to the destination are affected. Although it is difficult 
to prevent E2 from flooding the network, it should not be allowed to use 
legitimate nodes for forwarding the flooding.  
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Figure 17 Two illegitimate nodes attacking the network 
 
To limit attacks such as the ones described above, it must be possible to 
authenticate all the nodes in the network, as well as all the packets. Any 
node should be able to verify that the packets are legitimate, timely, and 
unique (no duplicates). Furthermore, the nodes should not be able to deny 
having sent the packets, hence making it possible to spot misbehaving 
nodes. 
 
5.2.2 Destroying the infrastructure 
 
The network may be subject to physical destruction, with the result that the 
network becomes partitioned and some services may no longer be 
available. In Figure 18, the network has been partially destroyed. The 
dashed squares show the destroyed routers and the dashed lines the routes 
that used to exist. The network is now partitioned into two separate parts.  
 
Physical destruction of the backbone network is especially severe. As a 
result, ad hoc networks may lose their connectivity and be left as floating 
islands where nodes are only able to communicate among themselves. 
Mobile nodes may lose their ability to roam if the mobility management 
schemes break down, for example, as a result of a lost connection between 
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the mobile node and its anchoring point. Servers may seize to function, 
such as name servers, key servers, weather servers, data fusion servers, and 
so on.  
 
Figure 18 A partially destroyed network 
 
To cope with partial destruction, routes and servers must be restored 
rapidly. To limit human involvement in the process, networks should have 
the ability to restore and configure themselves using whatever means they 
have available.  
 
In Figure 19, a more dedicated attack on the network is depicted. In the 
former case, a large portion of the network was destroyed, for example, as 
a result of bombing. The network was not the target of the attack, but it 
was yet affected by it. In the dedicated attack, the network is the primary 
target. Instead of eliminating several nodes, only crucial nodes are 
targeted. The crucial node in this case is the access router that connects the 
local area network to the backbone. Without the access router, the nodes 
have no connection to the backbone. Thus, instead of targeting the whole 
network, which would be impractical or even impossible, it is easier to 
find the crucial nodes and only eliminate them. 
 
A common solution is not to have any single points of failure, as the access 
router in the example. However, it is not possible to duplicate a service 
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endlessly either. In the case of an ad hoc network, where the cluster head is 
lost, the functionality can always be assigned to another node. Such 
dynamic solutions make it possible to eliminate the problem of single point 
of failures while not maintaining duplicate services simultaneously at all 
times. 
 
 
Figure 19 A targeted physical attack on the infrastructure 
 
To cope with destruction in general, whether it occurred as a side effect of 
an attack or as a result of a successful targeted attack, a means for rapid 
restoration is needed, where restoration does not rely only on the fact that 
the services are duplicated, but on the fact that services can be dynamically 
assigned to new nodes. This implies that the nodes may have dormant 
services, which are activated only when needed.  
 
5.2.3 Compromised nodes 
 
A compromised node is a node that has been taken over by the enemy, 
either directly (physically) or through the network. When the node has 
become compromised, it is completely controlled by the enemy. However, 
to the network the node still appears to be legitimate. Thus, the enemy has 
access to all services that the node is authorized to use.  
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If a node is compromised, the enemy is able to perform a variety of 
attacks, such as: 
 
• All the attacks that a masqueraded node is able to perform (see 
Section 5.2.1.). 
• Compromise other nodes by lying to them and thus gradually take 
over the network. 
• Break the "security" provided by various radio network level 
mechanisms, such as frequency hopping schemes etc., thus making 
it possible for the enemy to perform jamming attacks on the radio 
level. 
• Access all the services and information that the legitimate node is 
authorized to access and use the services and information to its 
own advantage, or perform malicious actions against the services 
and information. For example, the compromised node may modify 
information without violating its integrity, as the node is 
authorized to alter the information, and trusted to do so in a 
benevolent way. 
• Change network behavior by spreading disinformation. 
 
 
Figure 20 A network with compromised nodes 
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In Figure 20, an ad hoc network with compromised nodes is illustrated. In 
the depicted scenario, the compromised nodes may disrupt routing by 
dropping packets to prevent data from reaching the intended recipients, 
duplicate packets to waste network resources, and give erroneous route 
replies to route requests. Furthermore, both compromised nodes are able to 
collect important information about the structure of the network as well as 
which nodes are important.  
 
In Figure 21, the compromised nodes (E1 and E2) outnumber the 
legitimate ones (A). All nodes provide the data fusion server (DFS) with 
data. A sends DFS the correct data, X. However, E1 and E2, have agreed 
to send data X´, which is incorrect, to DFS. Without a proper trust 
handling mechanism, DFS assumes that A is the illegitimate node, and 
trusts the majority, that is, the data provided by the enemy. Hence, the data 
fusion image that is created is based on wrong data. Furthermore, DFS 
may claim that A is illegitimate and have the certificate of A revoked. In 
the long run, the enemy will have majority in the network, and is then able 
to control the decision making process. This is especially easy in the case 
where compromised nodes can selectively block messages from legitimate 
nodes. 
 
 
Figure 21 Compromised nodes affect data fusion 
 
The problem with internal attacks, such as the ones described above, is that 
traditional security solutions based on (strong) cryptography cannot be 
 67 
used. A compromised node has bypassed the protection given by 
cryptography; the private keys of the node is known to the enemy and 
there is no way to distinguish the node from a legitimate node, except by 
monitoring behavior. Behavior monitoring is not trivial. For example, a 
legitimate node may misbehave due to (temporary) malfunction, whereas a 
compromised node may behave well for  a long period of time, or 
misbehave in a way that is not easily detected.  
 
5.2.4 Network surveillance 
 
Merely observing the network traffic can be used to gain crucial 
information, even if the content of the network traffic is not revealed.  
 
In Figure 22, a scenario where a tactical battlefield network is under 
surveillance by the enemy is depicted. Thicker lines refer to a larger traffic 
flow, and the most crucial nodes are depicted as larger than less important 
nodes. 
 
Figure 22 The network is under enemy surveillance 
 
The structure of the network is easily revealed by the traffic flow itself. 
Nodes sending and receiving a lot of data are typically more crucial than 
more quiet nodes, however, it is easier to detect a sending node than a 
receiving node unless the recipient sends acknowledgments. The network 
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structure may also give away the command structure of the forces, thus 
making it easy to track down the commanders and eliminate them.  
 
Traffic analysis can also reveal the intent of the forces as well as their level 
of training. Traditionally, before an attack, the amount of traffic increases. 
Less trained personnel also tend to cause more traffic than well-trained 
personnel.  
 
Although the content of the packets are encrypted, the length of the 
messages can give a hint on what protocols are run. For example, if it can 
be deduced that a set of messages are part of a mobile node's location 
update procedures, it is easy to attack the mobility management.  
 
5.3 Security criteria for network level security 
 
To ensure correct and timely decision making for humans and computers, 
the network must fulfill certain security requirements. The attack scenarios 
described in previous sections show that the networks are vulnerable to 
various attacks that could affect the way decisions are made and carried 
out.  
 
The most important security criteria are the following: 
 
1. The network should be able to perform its tasks, namely transport 
legitimate packets intact to the right place(s) in time. This ability 
should not be affected even if the network is partially destroyed or 
otherwise attacked. 
 
2. Should the network become partially destroyed, a means of rapidly 
recovering is required to ensure continuous functionality of the 
network. This requirement supports the first requirement (that the 
network should be able to perform its tasks). 
 
3. Trust management is important to ensure that the information 
retrieved from the network is correct and the information that goes 
to the network will be properly handled. This implies that 
compromised nodes should be detected and removed. If the 
network cannot be trusted, it becomes useless.  
 
4. When performing its tasks, the network should not give away any 
information to unauthorized parties. In an utopist world, the enemy 
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is not even aware of the network; in an ideal world, the enemy can 
see the network but cannot deduce anything from it. In reality, 
enough privacy should be guaranteed so as not to reveal the most 
important information, namely the command chains, crucial 
network nodes, and intent. 
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6 Solution 
 
The military environment is difficult in many respects, but one of the main 
problems is the presence of an active enemy. All the solutions and ideas 
presented in this section assume that the network is under constant attack. 
The objective is to be able to operate in critical situations.  
 
Traditional security solutions do not address the security requirements 
listed in the previous Section. Most solutions address the security of the 
communication rather than the network itself. Furthermore, the solutions 
typically assume a rather static environment with a fairly limited number 
of network nodes. If mobility occurs it is typically assumed to be slow. 
The network medium is typically assumed to be wired, and wireless 
security is usually addressed by suggesting link level solutions.  
 
Furthermore, the military environment is hostile and the network is under 
constant attack, resulting in network nodes becoming compromised. Many 
traditional security solutions rely on symmetric cryptography for 
efficiency, however, symmetric cryptography becomes inefficient when 
nodes are compromised. This situation is especially severe in large 
networks with wireless mobile nodes, as the keys have to be renewed and 
new security associations established.  
 
In this Section, a set of solutions to address the security of the network 
infrastructure are proposed. The solutions include Packet Level 
Authentication (see Section 6.1.) to ensure that only legitimate packets are 
transported in the network, Context Aware Management (see Section 6.2.) 
to allow nodes to rapidly and securely adapt to the changing environment, 
Self-healing networks (see Section 6.3.) to ensure continuous 
communications even if the network is partially destroyed,  trust 
management based on incomplete trust to ensure that nodes only 
communicate with non-compromised nodes (see Section 6.4.), and privacy 
protection to prevent the network from leaking information to the enemy 
(see Section 6.5). 
 
6.1 Packet level authentication 
 
To address the first criteria, packet level authentication is proposed as a 
solution for authenticating packets (thus e.g. securing protocol signaling), 
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preventing denial-of-service attacks from paralyzing the whole network, 
and integrity protection. The PLA architecture is described in more detail 
in [67]. 
 
Despite the fact that it is possible to protect the communication with strong 
security protocols and encrypt the data with solid encryption algorithms, 
information flooding or shortage attacks still remain a problem with 
traditional solutions. External attackers can, for example, perform the 
following attacks:  
 
• DoS and DDoS attacks over the network paralyzing critical 
communication 
• Packet manipulation between legitimate senders and receivers 
• Duplication of IP packets of legitimate users 
• Manipulation of routes, thus causing information flood or shortage 
• Utilization of the complexity and vulnerabilities of the protocols  
 
In addition, internal attacks are very difficult to prevent since no scalable 
solutions exist to revoke compromised users or nodes. When legitimate 
users are relying on the steady operation of the communication 
infrastructure, any of the above mentioned attacks can easily paralyze the 
entire system. Especially, wireless networks are opening the physical 
networks to attacks. 
 
6.1.1 Previous solutions 
 
Traditional solutions for securing the network include link level security, 
and IPSec. 
 
In link level security, the link between two nodes is encrypted and the 
nodes are able to authenticate each other, see Figure 23. Thus, each node 
has a security association with its neighboring nodes. The problems with 
link level security in a dynamic military environment, where nodes may 
become compromised, are manyfold. When the nodes move, the security 
associations have to be updated. This requires a certain amount of 
signaling between the nodes, for which there may not be enough time. 
Furthermore, it is not possible to detect and handle compromised nodes. 
Any node on the path can modify the packets without being caught already 
by the following node.  
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Figure 23 Link level security 
 
The purpose of link level security in wireless networks has been to provide 
the same level of physical security as cables do in a wired network. Hence, 
link level security is not a solution for securing the network from the 
attacks mentioned previously. 
 
IPSec provides a solution on the network layer. However, IPSec in its 
basic form only provides end-to-end security. This means that the 
destination node is able to verify the authenticity and integrity of the 
packet, however, the nodes on the path from source to destination cannot. 
Hence, if a packet is falsified or modified, it will propagate through the 
network undetected, thus wasting network resources.  
 
Naturally it is possible to establish Security Associations (SA) between all 
nodes and thus address the problems from end-to-end security. However, 
since the network is dynamic, the SAs would have to be renewed on 
frequent basis. As the nodes may move fast, there is not sufficient time to 
run the IKE protocol. Storing the SAs in advance is not feasible either, as 
the size of a military network is too large and the nodes are by far too 
restricted. Furthermore, the amount of signaling traffic due to SA 
negotiations would be too large.  
 
Another problem with IPSec in this case is that the integrity of the packets 
is ensured using symmetric keys for performance reasons. The same key is 
used both for signing and for verification. Thus, a compromised node that 
receives a packet is able to modify it, sign it again, and pass it on as a 
legitimate packet. Hence, compromised nodes cannot be handled. 
 
6.1.2 The packet level authentication concept 
 
To secure the networks in a dynamic and hostile environment, it must be 
possible for any legitimate node to verify the authenticity and integrity of 
an IP packet. PLA solves the problem without suffering from the same 
limitations as link level security solutions and IPSec. 
 
 73 
The PLA concept resembles that of the security of money. Every modern 
note (e.g. a 100 euro note) contains several security measures to ensure the 
authenticity of the note, such as micro print, changing colors, watermark, 
hologram, metal string, etc. When a merchant receives the note from a 
customer, the legitimacy of the note can be verified on the spot without 
having to consult a bank. The requirement is that the merchant must be 
able to verify the authenticity of a note using predefined security 
procedures and without prior knowledge of the customer. 
 
In PLA, the same idea is applied to IP packets, that is, any node is able to 
verify the authenticity of the IP packet using predefined security 
procedures and without prior knowledge of or communication with the 
sender. The requirement applies for any receiver on the path from the 
source to the final destination(s). Thus, PLA is able of detecting 
illegitimate, erroneous, duplicated, and delayed packets in every router, not 
only at the final destination. In this way it is possible to restrict several 
classical attacks, such as denial-of-service attacks that are based on 
spoofing/forging IP packets and copying or manipulating legitimate IP 
packets.  PLA also includes additional security features to cope with 
duplicated and replayed packets. 
 
6.1.3 Design criteria 
 
The requirements for PLA are the following: 
• All information required for verification is in the IP packet. This 
means that the verification procedures can be based on one single 
packet, and no third parties need to be contacted. 
• Any node can perform the verification. 
• Duplicate IP packets must be recognized.  
• Delayed packets (e.g. as a result of a replay attack) must be 
recognized. 
• Removing compromised nodes from the network must not affect  
legitimate nodes. 
 
Based on the requirements, it is obvious that public key cryptography is 
required for the verification procedures. 
 
In turn, PLA places the following requirements on the network: 
• Deployment of standard PKI to provide TTP and revocation 
services as well as certificate management 
• A common sense of time 
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6.1.4 Design issues of packet level authentication 
 
The PLA architecture takes advantage of standard IPv6 [20] header 
extension techniques used for example in Mobile IP [68][41]. The PLA 
header is added to every IP packet and contains the following information: 
 
Node level information: 
• The identity of the trusted third party that has certified the node 
• The public key of the node  
• The validity period 
• The certificate from the trusted third party that certifies the key 
 
Packet level information: 
• Timeliness of the packet  
• The sequence number of the packet  
• The signature of the source node over the packet using the private 
key of the node 
 
 
With the node level information, any node (on the path from the originator 
to the final destination) that trusts the third party can verify that the 
originator of the packet is still among the trusted nodes without prior 
communication with that node. With the packet level information, that 
node can then verify that the originator of the packet has really generated 
this packet and the packet is not altered on the path from the sender to the 
receiver. Also, the node can verify the timeliness of the packet. 
Duplication of the packet is detected by using sequence numbers. Thus, 
corrupted, old, and duplicated packets can be discarded. This restricts the 
possibilities that the enemy have to attack the network. In the worst case 
[55], the enemy can make as many copies as there are separate routes to 
the destination node. In other words, the worst case is that the enemy is 
able to make a few extra duplicates. 
 
Public key algorithms are used for signing the certificates stating the 
validity of the key as well as the node's signature over the packet. The 
lifetime of the certificates is limited, thus making it possible to reduce the 
damage caused by internal attacks either by revoking the certificate or not 
renewing it when it expires. 
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6.1.5 Packet level authentication extension header 
 
The PLA extension header is depicted in Figure 24. Since the header is 
based on the standard IPv6 header extension technique, it is fully 
transparent and interoperable with routers that do not understand PLA. 
This means that PLA can be used together with any other protocols, such 
as Mobile IP or IPsec. If the PLA header is the first header in the packet, it 
protects both the data and all the other headers in the packet. Since PLA 
uses the standard IP header technique, the maximum IP packet size (MTU) 
handling is done correctly.  
 
The PLA header consists of seven fields divided into two categories:  
 
Node level information: 
• Auth_id: The identity of the trusted third party that has certified 
the node 
 
• Pub_key: The public key of the node (this public key is used by 
the verifying node to validate the sending node’s signature)  
 
• Val_period: The validity period (this field indicates when the 
public key is considered to be valid by the trusted third party) 
 
• Auth_signature: The certificate from the trusted third party that 
certifies the node (that the public key and validity period are 
correct) 
 
Packet level information: 
 
• Time:  Timeliness of the packet (i.e., time when the packet was 
sent; it can be used to discard old packets) 
 
• Seq_number: Sequence number of the packet (this monotonically 
growing field can be used in discarding duplicates and replay 
attacks) 
 
• Node_signature: The originating node's signature over the packet 
(this signature field ensures that the IP packet was really generated 
by the sending node and it has not been altered on the path). 
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Figure 24 The PLA header 
 
 
When the source node sends an IP packet, it fills the PLA header by taking 
the node level information (that is packet independent), incremented 
sequence number and current time. Finally, it calculates a signature over 
the entire packet and puts the result into the header. Then the IP packet is 
sent as any normal IP packet. However, variable fields of the packet 
cannot be protected, such as hop limit or routing header. The signature can 
be calculated using any of the standard digital signature algorithms, 
however, an algorithms like ECCDSA is promising, since the size of the 
signature and the public key in every packet can be kept short. 
 
When a node receives the first packet from the sending node, it first 
validates the node level information and after that the packet level 
information. If any of the PLA fields is invalid or incorrect, the receiving 
node can discard the packet and optionally inform its upstream neighbor 
about the problem. For the subsequent packets from the same sending 
node, it is not needed to validate the node level information if the verifier 
caches the previous validation result. Then, only the packet level 
verification is needed. Hence, the number of digital signatures that must be 
validated per packet is reduced from two signatures per packet to just one 
in case of several packets from the same sender. 
 
6.1.6 Analysis of PLA 
 
The objective of PLA is to enable any legitimate node to verify the 
authenticity, integrity, uniqueness, and timeliness of an IP packet. 
 
The authenticity is easily verified using public key cryptography. Any 
node can verify the signature of the trusted third party over the public key 
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of the sender. Integrity can be ensured by verifying that the signature over 
the packet is made by the private key corresponding to the public key.  
 
Since the sequence number is added to the packet, it is possible to ensure 
that the packet is unique and not a duplicate. Any duplicates will be 
dropped immediately. This prevents denial-of-service attacks from 
spreading in the network. Only the neighboring nodes of the flooder will 
be affected. The time stamp ensures that the packet is timely and not 
delayed. Packets that are too old will be dropped. The time stamp together 
with the sequence number provide a good way of handling duplicates and 
preventing replay attacks, because the sequence number may start all over 
again. However, the packet can still be distinguished as unique. 
 
PLA also provides non-repudiation, that is, a malicious node cannot deny 
having created the IP packets. 
 
As a result of the security solutions mentioned above, PLA can be used for 
authentication, integrity protection, denial-of-service attack restriction, 
firewall applications, access control mechanisms, billing and charging (in a 
commercial environment), and so on.  
 
However, PLA also has some limitations in its current form. The public 
key solutions introduce a problem with respect to identity privacy. This 
solution has not been solved, although temporary keys could provide a 
solution. However, this would increase the computational cost of verifying 
the certificate.  
 
Time stamps come with the problem of having a common sense of time. 
The nodes must be synchronized in order for the scheme to work properly.  
 
PLA also has some performance issues that need to be solved. The nodes 
on the path have to verify at least one digital signature per packet, 
sometimes two. Furthermore, the overhead of each packet is roughly 100 
bytes. However, the latter is merely a tradeoff; by including the PLA 
header it is possible to maintain communications even when the network is 
under attack, whereas without the header the network would be completely 
congested. 
 
However, with regards to performance, PLA also has some benefits. For 
example, comparing to IPSec where security associations have to be 
negotiated e.g. using IKE, PLA only requires one message to establish a 
security association. In Figure 25, node C arrives as a newcomer to a 
military network. It hears nodes A and B communicating, and hence, 
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learns their public keys. When C wishes to communicate e.g. with B, it 
sends an encrypted message to B containing the security association. Node 
B can right away verify the authenticity of C, and decide whether to accept 
the association or not. However, in most cryptographic schemes, it is not 
possible to use the same public key for encryption and signing. This 
example would thus have to use, for example, RSA.  
 
 
Figure 25 Establishing security associations in PLA 
 
6.1.7 Deploying PLA 
 
The deployment of PLA can be divided into three categories: initialization, 
communication, and special situations. 
 
INITIALIZATION 
 
Before the nodes enter the network, they must be validated. In a military 
scenario, the node is validated offline; it creates or receives a public key, 
which is signed by a trusted third party. When the node has been validated, 
it is able to enter the network, as it is now able to prove that it is a 
legitimate node. The validation of network nodes is depicted in Figure 26.  
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Figure 26 Validation of network nodes 
 
Since the initialization can be offline, the process can be secured by 
physical security means. 
 
COMMUNICATION WITH PLA 
 
When the nodes are in the network environment, they may begin to 
communicate with each other. 
 
When a node wishes to send a message, it adds the PLA header with all the 
required information and signs it.  
 
Upon receiving a message, the first node on the path verifies the 
authenticity of the sender. If the signature cannot be verified, the packet is 
dropped. If the sender is valid, the node checks the signature of the whole 
packet. If it is valid, the node passes the packet on. The authenticity fields 
are stored in the cache of the node for a short period of time, as this 
information will not change. Hence, only one digital signature verification 
is needed for further packets from the sender. The following nodes on the 
path from source to destination, including the destination node, may 
perform the checks in a similar fashion. 
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This operation resembles that of the CRC checksum calculated on the link 
level. The main difference is that only one node (the owner of the private 
key) can compute the correct checksum for the other nodes to verify. 
 
SPECIAL SITUATIONS 
 
There are three main special situations: 
• Acquiring a new certificate 
• Revocation of compromised nodes 
• Malfunctioning nodes 
 
When the certificate of a node is about to expire, the node may retrieve a 
new certificate from an online TTP server while it is still able to prove its 
legitimacy. Should the node not be able to contact an online TTP before its 
certificate expires, it must be reinitialized offline. 
 
Revocation of compromised nodes can be done by broadcasting the 
revocation lists using some technology that is difficult to disturb, for 
example, satellite communications. Since the revocation lists are signed, 
all nodes do not need to receive the lists directly; they may query other 
nodes for the list. 
 
Malfunctioning nodes may have lost their certificates. If the malfunction is 
fixed, the node should be reinitialized offline.  
 
6.2 Context Aware Management Architecture 
 
Most protocols and applications have been designed for fairly static 
environments. However, the dynamic nature of the military environment 
requires that the nodes are able to adapt to the changes rapidly. If the 
reaction is too slow, the it may result in the following: 
 
• The quality of service is bad. For example, the transmission of a 
video stream may contain glitches, or the service cannot be 
provided at all. 
 
• Resources are wasted. For example, a video stream is transferred 
from the server to the access network, but the access network is 
unable to deliver the stream to the mobile node. 
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• An uneconomical connection is used. For example, the node has 
several connections to the network, but uses one that is less 
optimal than another. 
 
• The decisions are not optimal. For example, the mobility 
management system chooses a non-optimal access medium. 
 
Traditionally, each application or protocol tries to adapt to the new 
environment independently. In some solutions, an application is 
specifically tailored to communicate with one other protocol layer. For 
example, the Real Time Protocol (RTP) [78] (and its control protocol 
RTCP) monitors the quality of the connection and informs the application 
(e.g. the multimedia video player) about degradation in quality. The  
application then changes the video encoding to better suit the current 
quality of the connection. Another example is a combination of Mobile IP  
with a mechanism for choosing the access medium considered optimal for 
the applications. 
 
The main problems with current solutions are the following: 
 
• The solutions are not generic. Thus, it is hard to add context 
awareness to protocols and applications. Adding hooks between all 
layers, especially through intermediate layers, would be too 
complex. 
 
• Protocol and application design becomes complex, as each 
protocol and application has to be tailored to intercommunicate 
with each other. 
 
• Old protocols and applications cannot take advantage of 
information provided by new protocols or applications without 
modification.  
 
To overcome these problems, a Context Aware Management (CAM) 
architecture is presented in [12]. In the CAM architecture, a new 
management layer is added to the Internet protocol stack. The purpose of 
CAM is to monitor the environment for changes and to adapt the behavior 
of the node to the current environment. The applications and protocols 
need not be aware of the environment at all, but rather focus on taking care 
of the tasks they have been designed for in the first place. For example, a 
routing protocol is responsible for establishing routes and forwarding 
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packets, but need not handle issues regarding the choice of access medium. 
The decisions how to change the behavior of the node are made by the 
Policy Manager (PM). Furthermore, the architecture consists of a common 
database, which contains all environment related data of the node. The 
database is accessed via CAM. Protocols and applications communicate 
with each other and with the database through CAM, using a standard 
interface. 
 
The CAM architecture is depicted in Figure 27. It contains the following 
components: 
 
• The Context Aware Management (CAM) layer. 
• The Policy Manager (PM) 
• The common database (CDB) 
• The modules attached to CAM. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27 The CAM architecture 
 
The CAM layer: The purpose of CAM is to provide a common layer to all 
modules that operate in the node to allow the node to behave in a manner 
optimal to the current environment. CAM offers two interfaces; one to the 
modules and one to the PM.  
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Interfaces: CAM contains two standard interfaces: one for communication 
between CAM and PM, and one for communication between CAM and the 
modules. The interfaces makes it possible to register and deregister new 
PMs and modules, set and get values in modules, and to schedule events. 
 
The Policy Manager: The PM is responsible for making the decisions 
regarding how the behavior of the node should be changed. The PM is 
aware of all modules that are loaded into the node. The PM also maintains 
the state information of each module. Thus, it is possible for the PM to 
make complicated decisions regarding the functionality of the node. For 
example, if the node enters an ad hoc network, the PM makes the decision  
regarding which routing protocol to use and with what parameters.  
 
If the node changes to another ad hoc network that uses another routing 
protocol, the PM may switch off the old protocol and switch on another. 
Another functionality provided by CAM is event handling. A module may 
request the PM to send a wake up signal upon the occurrence of a given 
event. For example, an application may request the PM to signal it once a 
given QoS level can be offered. This may  occur when a network interface 
(e.g. a WLAN driver) informs the PM of  a base station with sufficient 
signal strength. The security management module of the node may have 
declared that the given base station is on the list of trusted base stations 
and access could thus be allowed. The PM then informs the mobility 
management protocol to make a location update through the given base 
station. Once the connection is established and the required level of QoS 
can be offered, the PM informs the application. 
 
The PM makes the decisions based on a set of rules. The rules can be 
dynamically updated during the lifetime of the node. For example, the 
network management system in the network may decide that the nodes 
need to update their policy rules, and issues each node a new set of rules. 
The nodes in the network then perform the update. The policy can also be 
changed by the user of the node. The PM of the nodes in the network can 
also communicate with each other and exchange environment information 
and even policy rules (under some circumstances). 
 
Common database: The CDB contains all environment related 
information that is of interest to several modules. Such information may be 
the level of QoS, security related information, such as cryptographic 
material and trust levels of other nodes, and so forth.  
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Access to the CDB is managed through CAM. Each module is given a set 
of authorities as to which information in the CDB it is allowed access to 
and for what purposes. Typically, a module will be allowed to read a large 
variety of entries and to update its own entries. The PM can access and 
modify all entries in the CDB. 
 
The information in the CDB is always related to a module, although 
several modules may access and even modify the information (depending 
on their authority). The module is said to be the owner of the information. 
Information that is not owned by any module is owned by the PM. The 
owner of information may change, e.g. if the routing protocol owns certain 
information and PM switches the protocol to another, the new protocol 
will inherit the information. 
 
 
Modules: The modules are the protocols, applications, device drivers, and 
other pieces of software that communicate with each other and the PM via 
CAM. Modules are organized in a hierarchical fashion so that e.g. all 
network modules are organized under the category "access devices" etc. 
Thus, the PM is able to recognize new modules without modification. If a 
new category is added, the PM will be updated accordingly.  
 
When a module registers itself to CAM, it may (if CAM requires it) 
provide CAM with some proof of statement signed by a trusted authority 
stating that the module is trustworthy, i.e. that it does what it claims to do 
and nothing else. If the module is not considered trustworthy, it will not be 
loaded into CAM.  
 
If registration succeeds, the module will be assigned a set of authorities to 
CAM. The authorities state which information the module is allowed to 
read from the CDB and which information it is allowed to modify. 
Typically, the module will be allowed access to the information that is 
needed for it to perform its tasks as well as the privilege to update 
information related to itself.  
 
A module may deregister itself from CAM e.g. if the PM decides to 
deinitialize it. This may be because the user has made the request to 
change the module, the network management system has ordered a change, 
or CAM has detected a change in the environment that calls for the change 
of modules. 
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6.2.1 Deploying the CAM architecture 
 
The functionality of CAM can be divided into three phases: initialization, 
communication, and reconfiguration. 
 
INITIALIZATION 
 
Prior to entering the network, the nodes are configured with a certain PM 
depending on their tasks in the network. For example, static battery-driven 
nodes are configured with a routing protocol that takes energy-information 
into consideration, but which may not support mobility too well, whereas 
mobile nodes are configured with a routing protocol that supports mobility 
but perhaps makes tradeoffs regarding other requirements. Some nodes 
may be configured to not participate in routing at all. 
 
COMMUNICATION 
 
When the nodes enter the network, they will be subject to changes in the 
environment. For example, if a sudden degradation of QoS occurs, the PM 
may state that the applications are no longer allowed to send images, only 
text.  
 
The PM is able to dictate the rules that applications and protocols have to 
follow, and to change protocols and access media. For example, if radio 
silence is required, the PM dictates that no application is allowed to send 
any data and that protocols must not perform any protocol signaling. If a 
node from a highly mobile environment enters a more static environment, 
it needs to change its routing protocol to be able to communicate. Instead 
of the routing protocol itself shutting itself down and initializing another, 
CAM takes care of the switch by changing the protocol to be used. The 
routing information of the previous protocol can be made available to the 
new node through the common database. 
 
Nodes in the network may also negotiate terms on which to communicate, 
for example, with respect to access media and protocols.  
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RECONFIGURATION 
 
It must be possible to reconfigure the nodes even when they are 
operational in the environment. For example, the task of a node may need 
to be changed. Assume that a mobile node which has not previously 
participated in routing is needed to maintain communications of the 
network. In this case, the network management system may send the node 
a set of new rules, that is, update its PM. After this, the node will 
immediately drop its old tasks and start behaving according to its new 
rules. 
 
If there is a human user of the node, he may also change the rules of the 
node. 
 
6.3 Self-healing networks 
 
In a military environment, it is very likely that the network becomes 
partially destroyed from time to time. This is particularly severe if the core 
parts of the network infrastructure are affected. During an attack, it is too 
hectic for people to participate in rebuilding the network. On the other 
hand, surviving without communications may be difficult and have 
implications for leadership. Hence, a method for networks to heal 
themselves is required. 
 
By relying on the CAM architecture presented in the previous section, it is 
possible to replace destroyed nodes in an ad hoc fashion by assigning new 
tasks to available nodes[13].  In this way, the network may restructure 
itself to ensure that communications continues. Naturally, the network will 
not be able to perform as well as before the attack, however, the main 
criterion is still to allow the network to transport packets from source to 
destination(s). This rebuilding process is not limited to the repairing of the 
routing infrastructure only, but to all necessary services in the network, 
such as DNS, key servers, and so on. 
 
To ensure the security of the reconfiguration process, PLA is relied on. 
New rules will not be accepted by illegitimate parties, nor will erroneous 
updates be considered. 
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The process of rebuilding the network has the following steps. Note that 
this is only one possible way of performing self-healing: 
 
1. Detection that the network has been partially destroyed 
 
Typically, network management systems send ping requests to network 
nodes and are thus able to notice link drops, changes in packet loss ratio, 
etc. Should the network management system notice “significant” changes 
(e.g. a server does not respond at all), it moves from a network steady state 
to a network recovery state. 
 
2. Scanning for available replacement nodes 
 
In the network recovery state, the network management system starts 
scanning the environment, including the traditional ad hoc networks, for 
available nodes by broadcasting node request packets containing the 
following information: 
 
• Authentication information proving that the request is valid as it is 
coming from a legitimate source. Authentication is done using 
PLA. 
 
• Required services, e.g. routing/AODV. 
 
Nodes in the network that are able to perform the required services 
respond to the request by sending a node reply packet containing the 
following information: 
 
• Authentication information proving legitimacy relying on PLA. 
 
• Priority level of the node. The priority level states how important 
the node is in its current task in the network. 
 
• Node capacity (CPU/memory/battery power). 
 
3. Selection of nodes to be used as replacements. 
 
The network management system now knows the available nodes as well 
as their priorities and capacities. It first scans for suitable replacement 
nodes among the nodes with the lowest priority. If nodes with sufficient 
capacities are found, they are selected for the core ad hoc network. If not, 
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the network management system continues scanning in the next priority 
class, and so on, until suitable nodes are found. 
 
4. Activation of the core ad hoc network 
 
The network management system sends the selected nodes an update 
request containing a new Policy Manager for the CAM layer of the nodes. 
This will result in the nodes dropping all their current tasks, updating their 
PMs, and replying to the network management system with an update 
acknowledgment. 
 
5. Operation of the core ad hoc network. 
 
The selected nodes now operate in their new tasks and the network 
management system reenters the network steady state.  
 
Steps 1-5 are performed during the entire lifetime of the network. 
 
6. Deactivation of the core ad hoc network 
 
Once the network is no longer needed, it will be deactivated. The nodes are 
released from their current tasks when the network management system 
sends them a node release message. These messages are only sent to nodes 
that are to be released from the network, and to all nodes if the network is 
to be shutdown completely. Nodes reply with a release acknowledgment. 
 
The protocol described in steps 1-6 is depicted in Figure 28. 
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Figure 28 The network recovery protocol 
 
6.3.1 Deploying self-healing networks 
 
In Figure 29, the state graph of the network management system is 
depicted. The network management system has four main states: 
 
• Network initialization: in this state, the network establishes itself. 
The nodes are configured to their tasks, security associations are 
established, etc. 
 
• Network steady: in this state, the network operates normally. If 
unwanted changes occur, the network management system 
switches into the network recovery stage.  
 
• Network recovery: in this state, the network management system 
tries to recover the original functionality by searching for and 
configuring nodes to replace disrupted/destroyed network 
elements. Once the network management system considers the 
network to be sufficiently or completely repaired, it returns to the 
network steady state. 
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• Network deinitialize: in this state, the network shuts itself down.  
 
Figure 29 The state graph for the recovery process 
 
In Figure 30, the state graph for the network node is depicted. The node 
contains the following four states: 
 
• Node init: in this state, the node boots up and configures itself to 
the network. After that, it either enters an active or an idle state. 
 
• Node active: in this state, the node is active and operates in the 
network according to its set of rules. If the rules are updated, the 
node changes its operational behavior accordingly. The node can 
be deactivated and enter an idle state, or it can be shutdown 
completely. 
 
• Node idle: in this state, the node is alive but inactive. It may either 
be activated from this state or shutdown completely. 
 
• Node deinitialize: in this state, the node is shutdown completely. 
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Figure 30 The state graph of a node 
 
6.4 Trust management based on incomplete trust 
 
The concept of trust has been widely studied in the computer security 
literature [3][28][42][64][80][90][91].  
 
In [64], trust in a principal is defined to be a belief that the principal, when 
asked to perform an action, will act according to a predefined description. 
This belief implies that the principal will not attempt to harm the requestor, 
regardless of how it carries out the request. Trust is always expressed in 
relation to a principal and to an action. 
 
Trust has the following properties with respect to transitivity, symmetry, 
and reflexivity: 
 
• Trust is not necessarily transitive, that is, if A trusts B, and B trusts 
C, A does not necessarily trust C. 
• Trust need not be symmetric, that is, A trusts B does not imply that 
B trusts A. 
• Trust is assumed to be reflexive, that is, a node trusts itself 
completely. 
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The problem with traditional trust schemes is that they are completely 
black and white: either the node is trusted or it is not. This model is too 
restrictive for a military environment, where the nodes may become 
compromised. A too strict trust scheme would too quickly eliminate nodes 
from the network, thus resulting in a situation with possibly too many false 
negatives. This would severely impair the function of the network. 
However, if the trust scheme is too loose, it may result in compromised 
nodes being allowed to reside in the network, thus impairing the function 
of the network. Hence, a more flexible trust model is needed, where nodes 
that are being suspected are not eliminated right away, but are not relied on 
for critical functions either. The incomplete trust model presented in 
[9][10][11] proposes such a scheme. 
 
Incomplete trust is defined as a belief that a principal, when asked to 
perform an action, will, with probability p, act according to a predefined 
description. Incomplete trust is always expressed in relation to a principal, 
an action, and the probability that the action will be performed as agreed. 
 
Incomplete trust has the same properties as complete trust, but the 
transitivity of trust changes. For example, if A trusts that B behaves as 
agreed with probability 0.8, and B trusts C to behave as agreed with 
probability 0.5, then A can calculate its trust in C by using the trust levels 
from itself to B and from B to C. 
 
The different types of beliefs that a principal can have in another principal 
can be categorized as follows [73]: 
 
• Benevolence: the belief that the principal cares about the welfare 
of the requestor 
 
• Honesty: the belief that the principal makes agreements in good 
faith 
 
• Competence: the belief that a principal has the ability to perform a 
particular task 
 
• Predictability: the belief that the actions of a principal are 
consistent, and that the requestor thus can predict the behavior of 
the principal. 
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The level of trust may change over time due to the behavior of the 
principal. A principal that has behaved well in the past is assumed to be 
more trustworthy than a principal that is occasionally misbehaving. 
Furthermore, trust is likely to decrease faster than it increases since trust in 
a misbehaving principal will degrade immediately, whereas increasing 
trust happens gradually over time. 
 
When making decisions based on incomplete trust, the risks involved in 
the transaction as well as the possible gains of a successful transaction 
must be evaluated, as the value of trust level as such is non-descriptive. 
This means that a risk analysis has to be made with respect to each 
transaction that is made by the principal. 
 
The process of making a transaction is depicted in Figure 31. Although the 
depicted decision making process is for computers, it clearly resembles the 
OODA loop for human decision making. The steps are basically the same. 
Information collection is similar to the observation phase of OODA. 
Information is gained by own experience and the experience of other 
nodes. When engaging in a transaction, the level of trust is evaluated and a 
risk analysis is performed. This trust evaluation phase correlates with the 
orientation phase in OODA. In the decision phase, the decision is made 
depending on the outcome of the trust evaluation and the specified security 
policy. In the transaction phase, the transaction is either carried out or not, 
depending on the decision. Feedback from the transaction (or the lack of it) 
is sent to other nodes in the environment. 
 
In [73], incomplete trust was used as the basis for decision making 
between a seller and a buyer in transactions of electronic commerce. In 
[11], incomplete trust was used in the signaling of ad hoc network routing 
protocols as well as routing itself. The basic idea is to evaluate the trust 
levels of other nodes before accepting route updates or answering route 
requests as well as to evaluate the trust in each route to the destination 
node before deciding which route to choose for forwarding packets. 
 
Incomplete trust in a network-centric environment can be used for 
evaluating the validity of acquired information as well as the 
trustworthiness in network nodes (whether they have been compromised or 
not). The former resembles the example for electronic commerce, where 
trust management is done on the human-application layer, whereas the 
latter resembles the example for deploying incomplete trust between 
network nodes. The trust levels can easily be stored in the common 
database of the CAM architecture, and thus be used by protocols and 
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applications alike. Thus, incomplete trust management can be done 
without any changes to protocols and applications. 
 
Figure 31 The process of making a transaction 
 
6.4.1 Deploying incomplete trust 
 
The deployment of incomplete trust can be divided into three stages: 
initialization, communication, and elimination. 
 
INITIALIZATION 
 
Prior to entering the network, the node is initialized, for example, it 
receives its certificate and configuration. The level of trust is set to 1 (= 
100%), as the node at this stage is completely trustworthy. This is based on 
the assumption that the software and hardware of the node is trusted. 
Otherwise, the trust level may be set lower already at the initialization 
stage.  
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COMMUNICATION 
 
When the node enters the environment, it starts communicating with other 
nodes and participate in network operations. However, during the lifetime 
of the network, the behavior of the nodes may change so that they no 
longer act as they should. This may be because they are malfunctioning, 
there is a problem with the environment (e.g. the network medium is 
disrupted), or because they have become compromised. Separating the 
situations may be difficult. For example, a compromised node may not 
necessarily misbehave right away, but may behave properly for a long time 
to have its trust level increased. Only when the trust level is high enough, 
or when the time is right, will the node start misbehaving. 
 
If a node does not behave, the other nodes in the environment may lower 
its trust level as a result. The policy of the node states which transactions 
the node is allowed to engage in depending on the trust level. The trust 
levels in the policy may be changed depending on the level of paranoia. 
 
A node that behaves well, on the other hand, will have its trust level 
increased over time. 
 
Nodes in the environment may gossip and exchange their trust tables with 
each other. However, nodes do not listen to gossip from nodes they do not 
trust enough, nor do they spread gossip to such nodes. 
ELIMINATION 
 
A node whose trust level has decreased is no longer communicated with by 
the other nodes, and eventually it is eliminated from the network. The 
network management system issues a revocation of the certificate of the 
node.  
If the network maintains a cache of previous events, it is possible to nullify 
information with retroactive effects if it is shown that the information is 
incorrect due to the compromised situation.  
 
6.4.2 Ad hoc network routing based on incomplete trust 
 
In [11], ad hoc network routing based on incomplete trust is described. 
Traditional routing protocols use hop counts to determine the best route 
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from source to destination. However, it is also possible to use trust levels 
as a metrics. In practice, the trust level would not be the only metrics used, 
but for simplicity, other metrics are excluded from the example. 
 
In Figure 32, an ad hoc network with the corresponding trust levels in the 
direction of the arrow is depicted. There are two forms of trust related to 
ad hoc routing: 
• Link trust: the trust level denotes the trust that a node has to its 
neighbor, for example, node A trusts B to the level of 50%, but X 
only to the level of 5%. 
• Route trust: the trust level denotes the trust that a node has in the 
route to the destination. Route trust is determined by the link trust 
levels. 
 
 
 
Figure 32 Routing based on incomplete trust 
 
The purpose of signaling is to establish routes while preventing malicious 
nodes from requesting routes or affecting the routing tables of other nodes. 
Link trust is used to determine whether a route request or route reply 
originates from a legitimate node or a possibly compromised one. Error 
messages need not be handled, since nodes can typically only inform other 
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nodes of their own inabilities; thus, a malicious node sending an error 
message would actually tell the other nodes not to route via it anyway. As 
this would be beneficial for the other nodes, it is highly unlikely that a 
compromised node would behave in such a way.  
 
The process for making a transaction works as follows for signaling: 
1. Collect information: the information can e.g. be collected as 
described in [56], that is, nodes monitor whether the neighbors 
actually forward the packets or not, or collected from an intrusion 
detection system as described in [98]. 
2. Establishment of trust levels: the trust level is calculated based on 
the collected information. 
3. Decision making: the node needs to make a decision whether to 
respond to signaling requests from a neighbor or whether to 
believe in signaling responses received. 
The packet forwarding mechanism needs the value of route trust to 
determine, which route to choose (in the case of multipath routing), if any, 
or whether to forward the packets at all (in the case of singlepath routing).  
 
The process for packet forwarding works as follows: 
1. Collect information: the information can be e.g. packet throughput 
and overhead of routing transmissions. 
2. Establishment of trust levels: the trust level of the route has to be 
calculated. 
3. Decision making: the node decides which route to choose and 
whether to route or not based on the trust level and the risks and 
benefits of forwarding the packets. 
 
To illustrate the general idea behind routing based on incomplete trust, 
three simple examples are used: 
1. Average trust: the average trust method calculates the average trust 
of the links. The obvious benefit from this method is simplicity, 
however, it is not too expressive. 
2. Weakest link: the weakest link method excludes the paths with the 
weakest links. The benefit is simplicity, and it also forces 
malicious nodes to behave well for a period of time in order to 
increase their trust levels. 
3. Accumulated trust: the trust levels of neighboring nodes are taken 
into consideration when evaluating the trust they have in their 
neighbors. The benefit of the model is that it is proportional, 
however, it is easy for malicious nodes to fool the node into 
choosing an bad route. 
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In Table 9, the three example methods are applied to the network of the 
example in Figure 32. The choice of route is highlighted. 
 
Route Average trust Weakest link Accumulated trust 
A, B, D, F 0.77 0.5 0.40 
A, B, D, E, F 0.59 0.3 0.09 
A, B, E, F 0.35 0.25 0.04 
A, C, E, F 0.53 0.3 0.12 
A, X, E, F 0.45 0.05 0.02 
A, X, Y, F 0.68 0.05 0.05 
A, C, X, E, F 0.55 0.1 0.02 
A, C, X, Y, F 0.73 0.1 0.08 
Table 9 Determining route trust 
 
6.5 Privacy protection 
 
In [94], privacy is defined as the claim of individuals, groups, and 
institutions to determine for themselves, when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others.  That is, privacy is the 
ability to control what information is disclosed to other parties and under 
which circumstances. 
 
Wireless networks are especially vulnerable to traffic analysis, as the 
network nodes are difficult to hide. By passively monitoring traffic, it is 
possible to deduce, for example, the intent of the forces, the level of 
training, the command structure, the location of crucial nodes, and so on. 
Thus, privacy protection is crucial; since the nodes cannot be hidden, the 
solutions must present a way of making it difficult or impossible for the 
enemy to gain any intelligence by traffic monitoring. 
 
Several methods exist to extract information from monitoring traffic. 
Intelligence can be collected from the data itself, from the communicating 
identities and their location, from the fact that network nodes exist at a 
certain location at all, from the time of occurrence of a transactions, and 
from the type of transaction made. Hence, privacy can be divided into the 
following categories: 
 
• Data privacy: the data is not disclosed to an unauthorized party 
• Identity privacy: the identity of the principal is not disclosed to an 
unauthorized party 
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• Location privacy: the location (geographical or topological) is not 
disclosed to a third party 
• Existence privacy: the existence of a principal is not disclosed to a 
third party 
• Time privacy: the exact time of occurrence of a transaction the 
principal is making is not disclosed to a third party 
• Transaction privacy: the type of transaction is not disclosed to an 
unauthorized party 
 
In the following sections, each privacy category will be handled 
separately. However, the privacy classes have interdependencies, for 
example, it is not possible to provide existence privacy unless the data, 
identity, and location of the node is protected. 
 
The objective of this Section is not to present any new solutions to privacy 
protection, but rather to identify the various privacy classes and their 
respective problems.  
 
6.5.1 Data privacy 
 
Data privacy is concerned with protecting the contents of the traffic. 
Typically, data privacy is ensured by encryption, provided that the 
cryptographic keys and algorithms used are strong enough. All traffic 
should be encrypted regardless of its importance, since dividing traffic into 
secret and public flows would provide the enemy with the advantage of 
being able to deduce when and where important traffic is sent. 
 
IPSec [44] and the ESP [46] protocol provide confidentiality to IP traffic, 
and can be used both between gateways and end-to-end. In Figure 33, the 
various ways IPSec can be used is depicted. When IPSec is used between 
two gateways, it protects the traffic when it is routed over the insecure 
network. IPSec also provides Virtual Private Network (VPN) solutions, 
e.g. when a host is roaming but still needs to use the services of its trusted 
network. Furthermore, IPSec can be used between two hosts directly to 
provide end-to-end security. 
 
IPSec provides confidentiality on the network layer, that is, the endpoints 
are assumed to be network nodes rather than e.g. human users. To protect 
confidentiality on higher layers, an encryption scheme where the endpoints 
are human users rather than the network nodes is needed. For example, 
PGP provides confidentiality to email messages and voice communication.  
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Figure 33 IPSec security 
 
Data protection also supports other privacy classes. For example, by 
encrypting routing signaling traffic, it becomes harder to deduce the 
topology of the network.  
 
6.5.2 Identity privacy 
 
Identity privacy is concerned with protecting the identity of the 
communicating peers. The peer may be either a network node or a human 
user. Both human users and network nodes may have multiple identities. 
 
A public cryptographic key is typically used to denote the identity of the 
peer. The problem of identity protection is that the role of the identity is 
easily deduced by monitoring network traffic, even if the network traffic is 
encrypted. For example, if certain events always occur after a given 
identity has transmitted packets, it is fairly simple to deduce that the sender 
has a commanding position. Furthermore, deducing the relationship 
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between the nodes is also possible by monitoring which identities 
communicate with each other and under what circumstances. 
 
Identity protection becomes even more difficult when deploying PLA, 
since the public key is attached to every IP packet. The only solution 
would be to rely on temporary cryptographic keys, which are signed by the 
original key, but that would increase the number of signature verifications 
that are needed. Hence, the solution is not scalable.  
 
6.5.3 Location privacy 
 
Location privacy is concerned with protecting the location of the peers in 
the network. This problem is especially difficult in a wireless network or 
when a node is visible and stationary. 
 
In [29] a solution to protect location information which is based on 
security agents is proposed. The security agents are routers that receive 
packets encrypted with their own public key. When the security agent 
opens the packet, it finds the destination address of the following security 
agent together with an encrypted packet. This packet is forwarded to the 
following forwarding security agent until it reaches its destination. 
Although this scheme is elegant from a theoretical point of view, it has 
many problems in practice. The scheme does not work well with ad hoc 
networks where the network nodes move, as the nodes would need to 
know the exact path of security agents as well as all the required public 
keys, which can become difficult as the path may no longer exist as such 
when the packet has left the node. This situation is not similar to normal 
routing, as the routers on the path are able to adjust to changing routes, but 
the security agents are predetermined.  
 
Another proposal for protecting the location of the nodes is for the node to 
have multiple identities and multiple addresses. The node then uses 
whatever address it has assigned to it, and can even send packets from the 
same stream using different IP addresses. The corresponding node would 
be able to deduce from the identity which node it is communicating with, 
as the nodes have predefined security associations. An approach like this 
was taken in the Homeless Mobile IPv6 protocol [65], although for non-
military reasons. In Homeless Mobile IPv6 the security association is not 
bound to one address, but to a list of addresses. Thus, the node could use 
any of its addresses as the source address and any of the destination 
addresses of the corresponding node. Another partial solution to the 
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privacy problem is presented in [7], where source addresses were removed 
from the IP packets altogether. However, the source is revealed in the first 
packet, and the destination node is revealed in all packets. 
 
In Figure 34, location privacy is ensured by having communicating nodes 
transmit using low transmission power. The messages are then relayed by 
low power expendable repeaters to actual routing nodes, which use higher 
transmission power. Hence, only the routing structure of the network is 
revealed to the enemy, but the crucial nodes are hidden in the environment 
as they are difficult to spot. Both the repeaters and the routers are 
expendable, that is, if a router is destroyed, another router will be used 
instead. 
 
 
Figure 34 Location privacy in a wireless network 
 
6.5.4 Existence privacy 
 
Existence privacy is concerned with hiding the existence of nodes 
altogether. In the previous section, location privacy was partially provided 
by hiding the existence of the communicating peers. However, hiding 
network nodes is difficult, since they always leak information, such as 
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electromagnetic radiation and so on. The scope of their visibility may be 
limited, for example, by decreasing the transmission power and thus 
reducing their transmission range. In the future, an approach based on data 
transmission using light might become possible, which could enable better 
protection of the existence.  
 
It is a common misconception that solutions on the radio level are 
sufficient to deal with security issues of wireless networks. However, even 
if the network nodes would rely on frequency hopping to hide their 
existence, the solution is only temporary. The enemy may either use 
enough computational power and detect all the channels of the spectrum in 
parallel, or take advantage of compromised nodes.  
 
6.5.5 Time privacy 
 
Time privacy is concerned with protecting the exact time of occurrence of 
a transaction from being disclosed to an unauthorized party. The enemy 
may be able to see that a transaction is taking place based on the existence 
of network traffic, but it should not be able to tell when the transaction 
exactly begins or when it ends. This may be of interest e.g. to prevent the 
enemy from deducing the exact time when a specific command has been 
issued. 
 
There are no feasible solutions to this problem. Basically, threshold 
cryptography could be used in such a way that the transaction is completed 
when k out of n threshold parts have been received, and the receiver is able 
to open the encrypted information stream. However, this scheme has not 
been fully developed and analyzed, so nothing can be said about its 
feasibility. In practice, it seems that by providing data, identity, and 
location privacy, it is possible to ensure time privacy as well.  
 
6.5.6 Transaction privacy 
 
Transaction privacy is concerned with preventing an unauthorized party 
from deducing the type of transaction by observing network traffic. For 
example, the length of the packet may give away the type of transaction 
that is made, such as a location update in mobility management schemes.  
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7 Analysis 
 
In this section, the solutions presented will be analyzed with respect to the 
security requirements of the network. Furthermore, the attack scenarios 
discussed in Section 5 will be re-evaluated with the assumption that the 
solutions presented in Section 6 are deployed.  
 
7.1 Requirement analysis 
 
7.1.1 Performing network operations 
 
The first requirement states that the network should be able to perform its 
tasks, that is, to transport legitimate packets to the right place(s) in time 
and intact: 
 
The network should be able to perform its tasks, namely transport 
legitimate packets intact to the right place(s) in time. This ability should 
not be affected even if the network is partially destroyed or otherwise 
attacked. 
 
The PLA architecture presented in Section 6.1. provides the following 
services: 
• Authentication: it is possible to verify that the sender of the packet 
is legitimate 
• Integrity protection: the packet has not been modified by an 
illegitimate party 
• Non-repudiation: a sender cannot deny having sent the packet 
• Timeliness: the timeliness of packets can be verified and delayed 
packets dropped 
• Detection of duplicates: it is possible to detect duplicated packets 
 
The basic idea is that any node on the path from source to destination can 
verify the legitimacy of the packet.  
 
Basically the requirement can be split into pieces as follows: 
• The packets are legitimate 
• The packets are intact 
 105 
• The packets are routed to the right destination(s) 
• The packets are not delayed 
• All of the above should not be affected even if the network is 
partially destroyed or otherwise attacked 
 
The legitimacy of the packets is determined by verifying that the public 
key of the node has been signed by a trusted third party. Furthermore, all 
of the other fields in the packet must be correct. PLA is able to ensure this 
except for some of the fields in the IP packet that change as the packet 
traverses the network, such as the hop limit. 
 
The integrity of the packets can be verified by checking that the packet has 
been signed with the private key corresponding to the public key of the 
sending node. As only the sending node can produce the signature, packet 
integrity can be ensured. 
To ensure that the packets are routed to the right destination(s), the routing 
infrastructure must be sound. This implies that only legitimate nodes 
should be able to participate in routing and routing protocol signaling. 
When PLA ensures the legitimacy of the packets, it basically verifies that 
the sender is legitimate; the packets of illegitimate senders are dropped. 
Hence, it can be assumed that no illegitimate nodes participate in 
signaling.  
 
To ensure that the packets arrive in time, the routing infrastructure must be 
sound and the network must not be under denial-of-service attacks that 
constrain network resources and thus delay packets. The soundness 
criterion stated that only legitimate nodes may participate in routing and 
routing protocol signaling; PLA ensures that this is the case. To limit the 
effect of denial-of-service attacks, PLA is able to detect packet duplicates, 
erroneous packets, and delayed packets. Such packets are dropped as soon 
as they are detected, that is, at the first hop. Hence, the denial-of-service 
attack will not be able to spread in the network even if the packets were 
signed by a legitimate node. This ensures that the packets are able to arrive 
at the destination(s) in time, at least as far as security is concerned.   
 
The solutions mentioned above work under the assumption that no nodes 
are compromised. However, if the network nodes become compromised, 
they have access to the private keys and can thus bypass PLA. In that case, 
the compromised nodes are able to pass as legitimate, spread 
disinformation, distort routing signaling, perform denial-of-service attacks, 
and so on. To cope with this problem, the incomplete trust model can be 
deployed. If a node is misbehaving, it's peers will lower its trust level and 
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gradually refuse to communicate with that node. The network management 
system will be notified by the peers that they find the node suspicious. 
Once the network management system decides that the node is 
compromised, it will revoke the certificate of that node. Since PLA uses 
public key cryptography, the task of removing compromised nodes 
becomes easy, as it is not necessary to renew all the keys and shared 
secrets of other nodes. The only thing that needs to be done is to inform 
the other nodes of which nodes have had their certificates revoked. This 
can easily be done e.g. using a wide area broadcast technology, such as 
satellite communication or WWAN/WMAN solutions.  
 
The incomplete trust model, however, comes with some problems. 
Detecting misbehaving nodes is not a trivial task, especially since the 
compromised nodes may behave well in order to increase their trust levels. 
It is also difficult to distinguish between misbehavior and malfunction. 
Furthermore, compromised nodes may collaborate to make legitimate 
nodes look suspicious.  
 
7.1.2 Coping with network destruction 
 
The network should be able to perform its task even if it becomes partially 
destroyed. This requirement binds the first and the second requirement 
together, as the second requirement addresses a situation where the 
network becomes partially destroyed because of a large-scale or dedicated 
attack: 
 
Should the network become partially destroyed, a means of rapidly 
recovering is required to ensure continuous functionality of the network. 
This requirement supports the first requirement (that the network should 
be able to perform its tasks). 
 
The requirement states that a means of rapidly recovering from a partial 
destruction is needed. This requirement can be divided into the following 
parts: 
• Rapidly means that the networks heals itself faster than it would 
take for people to rebuild the network 
• The self-healing process is fully or partially automatic 
• The self-healing process is secure; the enemy should not be able to 
take advantage of the process to inject it's own nodes into the 
network 
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In Section 6.3, a mechanism for self-healing was presented. For the 
mechanism to work, the following requirements must be met: 
• Network nodes are able to accept new tasks 
• The network nodes must be able to verify that the request for 
changing their tasks is legitimate 
• The network management system must be able to verify that the 
network nodes that reply to the requests are legitimate 
 
To cope with the requirement of changing the tasks on the fly, the Context 
Aware Management architecture presented in Section 6.2. can be 
deployed. It was originally developed to allow nodes to rapidly adapt to a 
changing environment by having a policy state how the node should 
behave in each circumstance. The policies were coordinated by a policy 
manager. 
 
To change the tasks of a node, the policy manager of the node can be 
changed to a new one. Thus, the node will act according to a set of new 
rules. For example, as depicted in Figure 35, a node that previously 
collected weather data from the environment may need to drop that task 
and initialize a routing protocol in order to support the core network by 
remerging partitioned network parts. The Figure shows the partially 
destroyed network that was presented in Section 5.2.2. In the example, the 
routers that resided in the middle of the network were destroyed by a large 
scale attack. Hence, two network partitions with no connection to each 
other emerged. However, some non-routing nodes in the area managed to 
survive, such as the weather data collecting node. As it's policy manager is 
updated by the network management system, it drops its previous task and 
starts routing packets between the two partitioned networks. 
  
However, before accepting the new tasks, the node must be able to verify 
that the request came from a legitimate source. The network management 
system, in turn, must be able to verify that any node that signs up for a new 
task. 
 
To ensure the legitimacy of requests and responses, PLA is relied on. The 
network management system can ensure that the nodes which are available 
and sign up indeed are a part of the network, and the network nodes can 
verify that the request came from their own network management system.  
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Figure 35 A node is assigned the task of connecting two partitions of a 
network 
 
The proposed mechanism for self-healing meets the requirements of being 
rapid, fully or partially automated, and secure. 
 
The network management system typically notices failures in the network 
quite rapidly. Upon detection of malfunction, the network is scanned for 
available nodes and requests are sent to sign up for new tasks. Once the 
requests have been handled, the new tasks are sent out and accepted. The 
network is once again operational. The time required to perform this task is 
dependent on the network delays.  
 
The self-healing process is also fully or partially automated. The network 
management system is itself able to initialize the self-healing process and 
reorganize the network. However, it is also possible for a human to 
interfere with the restructuring process. 
 
Security is ensured by relying on PLA, as previously stated. 
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Apart from the self-healing mechanism presented in Section 6.3., other 
mechanisms are used in parallel to ensure the continuity of the 
communications and services. First of all, services may be duplicated to 
ensure that no single point of failures exist. This applies to the access 
medium as well; if one access medium is lost, other alternatives can be 
tried to ensure connectivity. Second, some nodes may have dormant 
features, which are initialized by the policy manager of the node. Third, 
some protocols, such as ad hoc network routing protocols, have support for 
dynamic behavior built in; if a route is lost, the node attempts to find new 
routes. 
 
7.1.3 Managing trust 
 
The perhaps biggest security problem in military networks is that of 
compromised nodes, as they bypass traditional security solutions, are 
difficult if not impossible to detect, and have the capability of damaging 
the network and affect the decision making process. 
 
Traditional trust management schemes have the disadvantage of being too 
strict and inflexible. Either a node is trusted or it is not trusted. This 
introduces a risk where compromised nodes are completely trusted for 
everything at all times, or that fully legitimate nodes are excluded too 
easily.  
 
The third requirement states the importance of trust management: 
 
Trust management is important to ensure that the information retrieved 
from the network is correct and the information that goes to the network 
will be properly handled. This implies that compromised nodes should be 
detected and removed. If the network cannot be trusted, it becomes useless.  
 
Trust management needs to be handled on two levels: 
• Human users evaluate the trust they have in information they 
receive from the network. The information may have been sent by 
another human or it may have been created by the network, for 
example, through sensor systems and data fusion into a real-time 
situation awareness image. 
• Network nodes evaluate the trust they have in other nodes when 
engaging in signaling with them.  
 
 110 
The trust model suggested in this thesis relies on the concept of incomplete 
trust. The purpose of incomplete trust is to introduce some flexibility into 
the decision making process of the nodes. As the military environment is 
uncertain, normal trust schemes would not work. However, by allowing 
nodes to change the level of trust they have in other nodes during the 
lifetime of the network, it is possible to better deal with the uncertainty. 
 
The requirement stated the following: 
• The information retrieved from the network is correct. This 
implies both information addressed for the human user as well as 
the signaling data addressed for network nodes 
• The information that goes to the network is properly handled. This 
implies both information sent by a human user as well as signaling 
data addressed for network nodes 
• Compromised nodes should be detected 
• Compromised nodes should be removed 
 
Traditional security solution cannot ensure the correctness of the 
information, they can only ensure that the information received is the same 
as the information sent (i.e. provide integrity protection). The incomplete 
trust model allows a user or a node to determine what actions to take 
depending on the level of trust in the information. That is, it is up to the 
user or node to determine whether the information is correct enough to be 
trusted. This trust evaluation is made based on previous experience, 
endorsements from the environment, and so on. For example, if a general 
has always received accurate information from a given source, he typically 
trusts that information also in the future, unless several of his trusted 
friends have told him that they have got bad information lately. The same 
idea applies to network nodes. A node that has successfully engaged in 
digital transactions, such as protocol signaling, with another node, 
continues to trust that node for that particular task unless several of its 
other trusted nodes start issuing warnings or if the network management 
system forbids engagement with that node.  
 
If a node is compromised and starts spreading disinformation, it will be 
noticed by the other network nodes or by the human users. Thanks to PLA, 
the node cannot deny having created the disinformation. This will lower 
the trust level of the compromised node and eventually get the network 
management system alerted to have the certificate of the node revoked. 
Hence, nodes spreading disinformation will eventually be eliminated from 
the network, unless they are somehow able to manage their trust levels by 
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behaving well for longer periods of time. This, however, would still 
minimize the damage a compromised node can do. 
 
The same applies for information that goes into the network. If a node 
modifies, delays, or destroys information, the trust level in that node will 
decrease. The same motivation as for retrieving information can be 
applied: a compromised node that does not want to be detected must 
behave well for long periods of time, thus taking away the effect of the 
attack. However, if the node misbehaves, it will be noticed and removed 
from the network. 
 
Detection of misbehavior is not a trivial task. Some proposals exist where 
nodes are monitored for whether they actually forward packets they are 
supposed to forward. However, if a node clearly misbehaves by 
duplicating packets, delaying packets, modifying packets, and so on, it will 
easily be detected thanks to PLA. Furthermore, a node that creates 
disinformation cannot deny having done so. The problems with detecting 
malicious nodes is, however, that they may behave well over a long period 
of time, and that malicious behavior is not easy to distinguish from 
malfunction. However, it can be argued that malfunctioning nodes should 
be eliminated from the network as well. 
 
Removing compromised nodes is fairly easy thanks to PLA. Since each 
node is identified by a public key, it is sufficient to revoke the public key 
and identify other nodes in the environment. This can be done using any 
wide area access technology. 
 
In Figure 36, an example of revoking a certificate is depicted. Nodes A, B, 
and C have all experienced bad service from node D. Hence, they inform 
the network management system of their experience with D. As so many 
nodes have had similar experiences with D, the network management 
system starts monitoring D. As D continues to misbehave, the network 
management system draws the conclusion that D is compromised, and 
revokes its certificate by adding D on a revocation list. The network 
management system then broadcasts the revocation list using satellite 
communications to reach the whole network environment. All nodes in the 
network environment will now be aware that node D is malicious, and 
refuse to communicate with it. 
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Figure 36 Revoking the certificate of a compromised node 
 
The main problem with the incomplete trust model at its current stage is 
that it has not been fully developed yet. More work needs to be done on 
the mathematical and logical background on how to manage fluctuations 
of trust and perform decision making. For example, a mathematical 
formula to be used to determine the level of trust that a node has in a route 
to another node should be developed in order to make incomplete trust 
deployable for ad hoc network routing. 
 
Another issue is that malicious nodes may cause the trust levels to 
fluctuate, and may also claim that legitimate nodes are compromised even 
if they are not. However, these problems exist in models based on 
complete trust as well, and are actually even more severe in those cases. 
For example, the trust levels would never fluctuate; a legitimate node 
would be declared illegitimate right away. 
 
7.1.4 Privacy protection 
 
The fourth requirement deals with privacy, which is another difficult 
problem in wireless military networks. The privacy requirement is as 
follows: 
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When performing its tasks, the network should not give away any 
information to unauthorized parties. In an utopist world, the enemy is not 
even aware of the network; in an ideal world, the enemy can see the 
network but cannot deduce anything from it. In reality, enough privacy 
should be guaranteed so as not to reveal the most important information, 
namely the command chains, crucial network nodes, and intent. 
 
The network should be able to protect the following information: 
• The content of the data 
• The identity of the communicating parties 
• The location of the communicating parties 
• The existence of a node 
• The time of occurrence of a transaction 
• The type of transaction 
 
The content of the data is trivial to protect with strong encryption. 
 
However, protecting the identity of the communicating nodes is difficult, 
especially since PLA is used. PLA unfortunately attaches the public key of 
the node into every IP packet, which reveals the identity of the sender. 
Temporary public keys could be used, but would increase the signatures to 
be verified. This, in turn, would degrade the performance and consume 
energy resources.  
 
Location privacy can be ensured to some extent by having crucial nodes 
send with low transmission power and deploying expendable nodes are 
repeaters and routers. However, nodes always leak information in form of 
electromagnetic radiation and so on. Hence, location privacy solutions, in 
particular if implemented in the protocols, only give a very limited level of 
protection. The same applies for existence privacy. 
 
Protecting the exact time of occurrence of a transaction is possible if data, 
identity, and location privacy can be ensured. In that case it is possible to 
deduce when a transaction occurs, as it is not possible to deduce who is 
talking what with whom and from where. However, as identity and 
location privacy cannot be sufficiently ensured, the problem of protecting 
the time of occurrence of a transaction remains an open issue. 
 
The type of transaction can be deduced from the length of the packet even 
if data privacy is ensured. Transaction privacy can be provided if it is 
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possible to vary the packet lengths by adding garble data into the packets. 
The garble data would be discarded at the destination. 
 
The privacy problems unfortunately remain unsolved. 
 
7.2 Scenario analysis 
 
The four scenarios presented in Section 5 will be re-evaluated with the 
assumption that the solutions presented in this thesis are deployed. 
 
7.2.1 Attacking the infrastructure 
 
In Section 5.2.1., a scenario where a masqueraded node is able to attack 
the infrastructure was presented. As a result of the masquerade, the node is 
able to perform the following attacks: 
 
• Denial-of-service attacks: the node is able to consume network 
resources by flooding the network 
• Disrupting protocol signaling, for example, the node is able to take 
part in routing signaling and thus change the network topology 
• Disrupting network traffic: the node is able to delay or drop 
packets, which may affect upper layer protocols 
• Traffic analysis: the node is able to spy on the network and collect 
intelligence 
• Spreading disinformation: the node is able to inject wrong data 
into the network 
 
Since all IP packets are authenticated using PLA, masquerading attacks 
can be excluded altogether (unless cryptography is broken or the enemy 
node manages to get its public key signed by a trusted third party, which is 
highly unlikely). Hence, the attacks mentioned above will not succeed 
unless a legitimate node is compromised. 
 
Traffic analysis, however, can still be performed even if the node is not 
part of the network, as long as it is able to pick up network traffic. As the 
traffic is encrypted, it can be assumed that the content is not revealed to the 
enemy. However, the identity of the communicating nodes and their 
location, as well as the types of transactions made may be revealed. 
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7.2.2 Destroying the infrastructure 
 
In Section 5.2.2., a scenario where the infrastructure was partially 
destroyed as a result of a large scale attack or a dedicated attack was 
presented. As a result of the attack, the routing infrastructure was impaired 
and services removed from the network. 
 
There are several ways of reorganizing a partially destroyed network: 
• The self-healing system presented in Section 6.3 is able to assign 
new rules to nodes so that they start performing new tasks. 
• By duplicating services it is possible to eliminate single point of 
failures. All services need not be operational simultaneously; some 
may be dormant and started up only when needed. 
• Nodes in the environment may vote on which one of them will 
take on a task previously held by another node. For example, if a 
cluster head is lost, the nodes in the cluster may vote for a new 
cluster head. 
 
The basic idea in this thesis is to primarily rely on the self-healing 
mechanism presented in Section 6.3. together with duplicated services, 
where some services may be dormant. Only if a network cluster is 
separated from the network management system altogether should it rely 
on voting schemes. However, protocols that by default support dynamic 
behavior, such as ad hoc network routing protocols, should naturally 
restructure as they normally would when changes in routes occur. 
 
In Figure 37, the recovering from the dedicated attack presented in Section 
5.2.2 is depicted. The network management system is able to reach the 
network that lost its access router. By relying on the self-healing 
mechanism, it presents one of the nodes in the network with new rules. 
The selected node now starts to function as the access router, and the 
network can be connected to the backbone again.  
 
The main difference is that the new access router may have limited 
performance and lifetime, however, it is still better to have some 
connectivity than none at all. When the battery of the node dies, another 
node is assigned the role of the access router. This goes on until the 
original access router can be replaced by a new one which has originally 
been designed for that particular task. 
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Figure 37 Choosing a new access router 
 
 
7.2.3 Compromised nodes 
 
In Section 5.2.3., a scenario where some of the nodes were compromised 
was presented.  
 
In the scenario, the compromised node was able to perform: 
 
• Denial-of-service attacks: the node is able to consume network 
resources by flooding the network 
• Disrupting protocol signaling, for example, the node is able to take 
part in routing signaling and thus change the network topology 
• Disrupting network traffic: the node is able to delay or drop 
packets, which may affect upper layer protocols 
• Traffic analysis: the node is able to spy on the network and collect 
intelligence 
• Spreading disinformation: the node is able to inject wrong data 
into the network 
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• Compromise other nodes by lying to them and thus change 
network behavior 
• Break the security of radio network level schemes, such as 
frequency hopping 
• Access information and services 
 
Denial-of-service attacks are detected already at the first hop from the 
flooder. By relying on PLA, the certificate of the flooding node can be 
revoked. Thus, in this case, the compromised node is detected and 
removed. 
 
As far as the other attacks are concerned, they are more difficult to detect 
in the first place. A compromised node may, for example, advertise cheap 
routes and thus attract all data through itself. This behavior would only get 
attention if a sender experiences bad service and decides to try another, 
more expensive route, which in reality offers better service. However, if 
the compromised node disrupts the network traffic by only randomly 
delaying or dropping packets in such a way that the service experienced is 
not noticeably bad, but the overall performance of the network gradually 
becomes bad, the attack is not necessarily easy to detect. 
 
Traffic analysis is an even bigger problem when the node is compromised, 
as the node now has access to all the routing tables. Data privacy can be 
ensured as long as the compromised node is not one of the recipients. 
However, all other privacy classes are violated. The inside information that 
the node has, for example, the hop frequency on the radio level, can be 
used to attack the network further. For example, it is no use for a 
compromised node to flood the network as it would get caught right away, 
but it could instead reveal the hop frequency to the "home base" to allow 
the enemy to jam the network from outside. 
 
If the compromised node behaves well, it will go undetected for longer 
periods of time. Hence, it may access services and information and thus 
collect intelligence. Small changes are not likely to be noticed, however, 
over time the information will be completely distorted, thus affecting the 
decision making process. 
 
The problem gets even worse if we look at the scenario in Section 5.2.3, 
where two compromised nodes were strategically placed in the network, 
see Figure 38. In the example, the compromised nodes are able to partition 
the legitimate nodes into two separate parts.  
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Figure 38 Strategic placement of malicious nodes 
 
To take over the whole network, the two network nodes that are separated 
from the four other legitimate nodes are now fed with lies. The first node 
to convert into evil is the one that gets bad data fed from both 
compromised nodes. After that, the sole legitimate node gets bad data from 
the compromised and the converted nodes. Eventually, it will convert as 
well. The difference between a compromised and a converted node is that 
the compromised node is controlled by the enemy whereas a converted 
node in theory is not, but it's behavior is affected by the compromised 
nodes.  
 
Now the situation is basically four "evil" nodes against four "good" nodes. 
To take over the rest of the network, it is sufficient to get one node to 
convert. After that, the compromised nodes have majority, and the rest of 
the network will gradually convert and behave accordingly. 
 
Another possibility in this scenario is for the compromised nodes to 
convince the legitimate nodes in each respective partition that the nodes in 
the other partition are compromised. This would result in a permanent 
partition of the network nodes. The compromised nodes may even move 
away from the area and enter new network environments and continue 
posing their lies on other nodes, thus creating network partitions all over 
the network environment. The problem with this approach, however, is 
that it is likely to be detected. The network management system pays 
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attention to nodes who are claimed to be compromised. Eventually, a 
pattern is likely to emerge from the events: partitions occur wherever 
certain nodes have been. 
 
To understand the contribution of incomplete trust to the problems 
discussed above, it is compared to trust models based on complete trust.  
 
Both models face the same problem: detecting anomalies. However, it is 
more difficult for a compromised node to operate in an environment based 
on incomplete trust. First of all, the trust levels fluctuate. Hence, the 
compromised node must constantly monitor its own behavior, otherwise it 
runs the risk of losing the trust other nodes have in it. The smaller the trust 
level, the less of a chance it has to affect other nodes. In a complete trust 
model, small misbehaviors would not be noticed and the node would 
always be fully trusted. Hence, the damage a completely trusted node may 
cause is larger.  
 
Second, converted nodes differ from compromised nodes in that they still 
monitor the environment for changes. They may be affected by other good 
nodes in the environment and change their opinion again. This means that 
the compromised nodes must constantly keep the converted nodes in 
control in order to take over the network. In a complete trust model, the 
compromised nodes could have cut off the converted nodes from other 
legitimate nodes in the network by claiming that they are compromised. In 
the incomplete trust model, the converted nodes only gradually shift their 
opinion in this direction, thus causing a delay in the overtaking process. 
Furthermore, the opinion may shift back and forth since the nodes still 
communicate with the other legitimate nodes. 
 
Third, converted nodes may show signs of anomalies although they are not 
compromised. In a complete trust model, the nodes would be eliminated 
from the network as compromised. This would enable the compromised 
nodes to eliminate other nodes until they get the majority in the network. 
However, with incomplete trust, the trust in the converted nodes only 
decrease, but they are not eliminated. If they come in contact with good 
nodes again, their behavior will change into normal. Hence, the risk of 
false positives is smaller in the incomplete trust model. 
 
As a conclusion, incomplete trust provides a more flexible way of coping 
with compromised nodes than models based on complete trust. If a 
compromised node is detected, it can be eliminated from the network 
thanks to the fact that PLA is used to secure the network and it relies on 
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public key cryptography to identify nodes. Hence, to eliminate a 
compromised node, it's certificate is revoked. 
 
7.2.4 Network surveillance 
 
As has been previously discussed, privacy protection in wireless military 
networks is difficult. Some level of privacy can be provided, such as data 
privacy, and in some cases even location privacy to some extent. This, 
however, assumes that there are no compromised nodes in the network. 
 
The attack scenario in Section 5.2.4 is thus possible and even highly likely. 
 
 121 
 
8  Conclusion 
 
The development of warfare has gone hand in hand with the development 
of the society. With the proliferation of information and communication 
technology, it has become possible to collect, process, analyze, and 
distribute information efficiently. Whereas the modern society is often 
referred to as the "Information Society", the military has developed 
corresponding concepts referred to as "Information Warfare" and 
"Network-Centric Warfare". The information warfare concept is mainly an 
idea where information is used both as a target and a weapon. By targeting 
information, or using it as a weapon, it is possible to affect e.g. political 
and military decision making. The information operations need not 
necessarily be targeted directly at the decision makers, but may address the 
public opinion either in favor or against the decision makers. In network-
centric warfare, the idea is taken even further. Networks are used as the 
enabling factor of conducting information warfare. The restrictions 
imposed by location and time are almost eliminated altogether. The actual 
information battle is a fight over information superiority, where the 
purpose is to achieve accurate real-time situation awareness while denying 
the enemy from doing the same. It is assumed that the better the situation 
is known and understood, the better decisions can be made, and ultimately 
the party that has made more correct decisions will win the war. 
 
The decision making process can be modeled using the OODA loop 
developed by Col. John Boyd from the US Air Force. OODA stands for 
Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. In the observation phase, data is 
collected from the environment and fed into the orientation phase. The 
orientation phase is dependent on personal characteristics, such as genetic 
heritage, previous experience, and so on. In this phase, a mental image of 
the situation is created based on the observations and a list of alternative 
decisions is formed. In the decision phase, one of the alternatives is 
chosen, and the decision is carried out in the action phase. 
 
The strategy is to go through one's own OODA loop as efficiently as 
possible while denying the enemy from doing the same. Typically, the 
OODA loop can be affected in several ways. Disinformation may be 
spread into the observation phase to affect the mental image to be created. 
The orientation phase can be targeted by changing the way people form 
their mental images. For example, the mental image is dependent on 
cultural values and previous experience. Typically, propaganda and 
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psychological operations have been used to affect the way people perceive 
things. This is taken advantage of also in marketing, for example, the 
whole "get them while they are young" thinking relies on the fact that 
when people have positive experiences from something, they build a 
pattern of e.g. always choosing the same product. Newspapers give 
inexpensive subscriptions to students so that they will continue subscribing 
to the paper when they have graduated. Also the decision phase can be 
targeted by psychological means, but also the environment and the 
situation affects the decision. For example, a person who is afraid is likely 
to make different decisions than he otherwise would. Fear has been used 
throughout history to affect public opinion in a desired direction, for 
example, to support warfare, affect elections, accept a change in the 
legislation that may not be beneficial for the individual, and so on. The 
action phase, in turn, can not only be targeted directly, it can also be 
observed (these observations are fed into the OODA loop of the other 
party) in order to gain intelligence of the opponent.  
 
In a network-centric environment, where the network functions as a tool 
for leadership, the decision making process can be directly targeted in its 
observation phase and its action phase. 
 
In the observation phase, where information is collected from the network, 
there are various ways of affecting what is fed into the orientation phase. 
First of all, disinformation may be injected into the network, or existing 
information may be modified This will create an erroneous situational 
awareness image in the orientation phase. Second, information can be 
delayed in various ways. Hence, the situational awareness image may no 
longer be timely. Third, information can be destroyed altogether so that it 
is not possible to construct a clear image of the situation. Furthermore, 
information can be duplicated or flooded so that more information is 
available than can be processed. All of the possibilities above may cause 
confusion, and thus delay the decision making process or lead to wrong 
decisions being made. 
 
In the action phase, the outcome of the decision may be communicated to 
the network-centric environment. For example, a command may be sent 
from a decision maker to a soldier or weapon system, or the topology of 
the network will change since nodes move as a result of the action being 
carried out. In the former case, the command can be attacked in several 
ways. It is possible to destroy it so that it never reaches its destination, 
delay it so that it reaches the destination too late, modified so that the 
command is changed into something else, etc. In the latter case, it is 
possible to merely keep the network under surveillance to collect 
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intelligence, and later deduce e.g. that when a certain type of message is 
sent from a certain location to another given location, the forces are about 
to perform an attack. 
 
Hence, in order for the network to be useful as a supportive tool for 
leadership, it must be secured from the attacks mentioned above. 
 
In this thesis, the possible attacks were discussed using attack scenarios. 
The scenarios addressed attacks on the network itself, partial destruction of 
the network either by a large-scale or dedicated attack, internal attacks 
performed by compromised nodes, and the possibilities of gathering 
intelligence by network surveillance. Based on the scenarios, the following 
security requirements were identified: 
 
1. The network should be able to perform its tasks, namely transport 
legitimate packets intact to the right place(s) in time. This ability 
should not be affected even if the network is partially destroyed or 
otherwise attacked. 
 
2. Should the network become partially destroyed, a means of rapidly 
recovering is required to ensure continuous functionality of the 
network. This requirement supports the first requirement (that the 
network should be able to perform its tasks). 
 
3. Trust management is important to ensure that the information 
retrieved from the network is correct and the information that goes 
to the network will be properly handled. This implies that 
compromised nodes should be detected and removed. If the 
network cannot be trusted, it becomes useless.  
 
4. When performing its tasks, the network should not give away any 
information to unauthorized parties. In an utopist world, the enemy 
is not even aware of the network; in an ideal world, the enemy can 
see the network but cannot deduce anything from it. In reality, 
enough privacy should be guaranteed so as not to reveal the most 
important information, namely the command chains, crucial 
network nodes, and intent. 
 
 
The requirements were then addressed by a set of security solutions. The 
assumption made when developing the solutions was that the networks are 
under constant attack by the enemy. This assumption comes from the fact 
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that the military environment is hostile, and the enemy is highly likely to 
try to attack the networks in various ways. 
 
The military environment is difficult in many respects. The networks are 
dynamic in nature and most of the communications medium is wireless. 
Furthermore, the networks are subject to weather conditions, terrain, 
hostile activities, and so on. Traditional security solutions cannot be 
applied, since they may not solve the problems of the military environment 
or they may not scale well. For example, the network cannot be used with 
IPSec, because it is and end-to-end security protocol (in its basic form) and 
the alternatives where IPSec can be used in a node-to-node scenario are 
not secure for an environment where nodes may be compromised. 
Furthermore, since the size of the networks tend to be large, it would be 
infeasible for a network node to store the security associations of all the 
other nodes. Hence, key agreements would have to be made when needed. 
The IKE protocol is too heavy for this task, as it requires too many 
protocol rounds. When the nodes are highly mobile, they may not even 
have time to finish the protocol.  
 
Another problem in military networks is trust management. Traditional 
trust management models are based on complete trust, i.e. either a node is 
trusted or it is not. Such models are, however, too inflexible to be used 
when some of the nodes are compromised and perform intelligent attacks 
on the network. The problem with compromised nodes, on the other hand, 
is that they are difficult to detect. Until detected, they are able to perform 
the same things as the legitimate nodes, as the protection provided e.g. by 
cryptography is bypassed. 
 
In this thesis, a set of security solutions and ideas have been developed to 
address the requirements. 
 
The Packet Level Authentication (PLA) architecture is proposed as a 
solution for securing the network. The basic idea behind the architecture is 
that any node in the network is able to verify the legitimacy of any IP 
packet. This is realized by adding the public key of the sender into every 
IP packet and signing the packet using the corresponding private key. The 
public key is also signed by a trusted third party. The PLA header also 
contains other important information, such as the creation time of the 
packet, the sequence number of the packet, and the validity period of the 
packet. Hence, it is possible to detect illegitimate packets, duplicates, 
delayed packets, and so forth. Furthermore, a node cannot deny having 
sent a packet. These features make it possible to limit the scope of denial-
of-service attacks, remove compromised nodes from the network (by 
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revoking their certificates), drop nodes that are illegitimate or delayed, as 
well as to provide access control, firewall services, and so on. 
 
To support rapid restructuring of a partially destroyed network, the 
Context Aware Management (CAM) architecture together with a self-
healing mechanism is deployed. The CAM architecture was originally 
designed to allow nodes to rapidly adapt to the changing environment 
without introducing complexity into application and protocol design. For 
example, a node using a certain routing protocol may need to switch into 
another protocol if it enters an environment where a different protocol is 
used. To have the routing protocols themselves coordinate these actions 
would be difficult. However, by deploying CAM, it is possible to shut 
down the routing protocol and initialize another. This is enabled by adding 
a CAM layer to the IP stack. The CAM layer is able to communicate with 
all other layers of the stack. A common database is used to store 
environmental data. To adjust the behavior of the node, the Policy 
Manager contains a set of rules that state how a node should behave in any 
given situation. 
 
This feature is utilized by the self-healing mechanism presented in this 
thesis. If the network loses important nodes because of partial destruction, 
any other available node can be assigned the tasks if the lost nodes. This is 
not only limited to routing, but also to other key services, such as DNS, 
information services, key servers, etc. The network management system 
coordinates the restructuring process of the network. When the available 
nodes are found, their Policy Managers f the selected nodes are updated, 
and the nodes start performing their new tasks. The process is secured by 
PLA, that is, only legitimate nodes may be selected, and the nodes only 
accept the new tasks if they can verify that the network management 
system is legitimate. 
 
To cope with compromised nodes, the thesis proposes a trust model based 
on incomplete trust. The basic idea is that the behavior of the nodes is 
monitored by their environment, and a sense of trust is formed between the 
nodes. If a node misbehaves, it's level of trust will decrease, whereas the 
trust level of a well behaving node will increase. When making 
transactions, such as which route to choose, the trust levels are taken into 
consideration. Eventually, if the trust level of a node decreases too much, it 
will be considered compromised, and eliminated from the network. 
Although the incomplete trust model does not solve the problem of 
compromised nodes, it provides a better alternative than models based on 
complete trust. 
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One of the main problems in wireless networks is privacy protection. The 
network always leaks information of some sort. Even if the contents of the 
information is revealed, it is still possible to detect traffic patterns and 
deduce the intent of the forces, the level of training, and so on. 
 
In this thesis, the following six privacy classes were identified and 
discussed: 
 
• Data privacy: the data is not disclosed to an unauthorized party 
• Identity privacy: the identity of the principal is not disclosed to an 
unauthorized party 
• Location privacy: the location (geographical or topological) is not 
disclosed to a third party 
• Existence privacy: the existence of a principal is not disclosed to a 
third party 
• Time privacy: the exact time of occurrence of a transaction the 
principal is making is not disclosed to a third party 
• Transaction privacy: the type of transaction is not disclosed to an 
unauthorized party 
 
Existing solutions were presented, and their restrictions were pointed out. 
Unfortunately, the PLA architecture presented in this thesis makes privacy 
protection even more difficult, especially with respect to identity privacy. 
 
The thesis has shown that decision making can be affected through the 
network-centric environment and pointed out the main security concerns 
that must be taken into consideration. Furthermore, a set  of solutions has 
been presented and analyzed. It has been shown that while some of the 
problems can be solved, there still remains a lot of open problems that 
must be addressed.  
 
8.1 Applicability to the civilian environment 
 
Information warfare, or rather, information operations, may be targeted at 
the civilian community as well as the military. Hence, companies, 
government agencies, and the society as a whole need to be protected from 
information attacks carried out by criminals, activists, terrorists, 
competitors, and foreign governments. The model presented in Section 5, 
where the military decision maker collects information from the network-
centric environment and feeds it into his decision making cycle is thus 
equally valid in the civilian environment. This is especially true in 
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network-centric societies, where individuals, companies, and organizations 
are densely networked and more or less dependent on the underlying 
communication infrastructure to work. 
 
As far as the threat models are concerned, the civilian environment differs 
slightly from the military environment. The military environment is 
considered to be hostile in nature, with an active enemy constantly 
attempting to affect the decision making process through the network. In 
the civilian case, the environment is far from peaceful, but there are still 
significant differences. For example, the civilian infrastructure is not 
threatened by physical destruction on a daily basis. Also the motivation of 
attacking the network may differ, ranging from amateurs and script kiddies 
playing around to organized crime with financial objectives. The former 
are often easily caught and tried, whereas the latter are a real problem for 
the society. 
 
However, in time of crisis or war, the civilian network-centric environment 
becomes entangled with the military environment to a large extent. The 
enemy may strive to affect political and military decision making by 
simultaneously attacking the civilian infrastructure and the armed forces, 
thus causing confusion, decreased public support for military operations, 
and eventually a withdrawal from the battle or war.  
 
The solutions presented in this thesis may be applied to the civilian 
environment as well as the military one. To study the applicability, the 
various solutions are deployed to an example civilian network scenario.  
 
8.1.1 PLA in a civilian environment 
 
To study the use of PLA in a civilian environment, we suggest two 
scenarios; one for the individual user and one relevant for civilian 
organizations. 
 
Scenario 1 
 
The use of mobile Internet services has increased rapidly in the last years. 
Typically, individual users sign up for a mobile subscription provided by 
an operator. The operator may, for example, use volume based billing to 
charge for the provided services, and the user has agreed to pay the bill 
once a month. 
 
 128 
Assume that a user one month receives a bill which claims that the user 
has sent and received data that the user in fact has not. There is no way for 
the user to prove his case. Typically, the operator is the stronger party in a 
dispute. 
 
To cope with such a situation, PLA could be deployed for charging 
purposes. Since the user signs all the IP packets he sends, there is no way 
for the user to deny having sent the packets. On the other hand, the 
operator cannot claim that the user has sent packets he has not sent, as the 
operator would have to forge packet signatures in order to be able to do so. 
 
Furthermore, PLA can be used to protect the network of the operator and 
for mutual authentication of users and operators. From the point of view of 
the operator, PLA offers access control (only packets sent by legitimate 
users will be routed), firewall services, denial-of-service attack prevention, 
QoS provisioning, and intrusion prevention (a user attempting to intrude 
the system would be immediately identified). From the point of view of the 
user, on the other hand, PLA ensures that the access network the user 
connects to is legitimate and that the network operator cannot enforce 
unfair charging of the user. 
 
Scenario 2 
 
In the event of a strategic strike, terrorist attack, or a large-scale disaster 
(natural or man-made), it may be necessary for several rescue agencies to 
cooperate on the scene. Each rescue agency may have its own 
communication system, however, the systems may need to both 
communicate with each other and to maintain certain network aspects 
within the own organization only. For example, assume that the police and 
fire brigade arrive at the scene of a disaster. The organizations need to 
communicate in order to coordinate tasks and exchange general 
information.  
 
PLA comes with a certificate, thus making it easy to delegate trust and 
authorize network nodes to communicate with each other. Hence, the 
police and fire brigade may each authorize their respective networks to 
communicate with each other, that is, to trust certificates signed by the 
trusted third party of the other organization. The certificate will be valid 
throughout the operation. 
 
The use of PLA naturally ensures that outsiders are not able to participate 
in network communications, thus obstructing the operation. 
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8.1.2 Context Aware Management 
 
The CAM architecture was developed to enable network nodes to rapidly 
react to a changing environment. 
 
A mobile user may encounter changes in the environment while roaming, 
such as perceived signal strength of various access networks, availability 
of a multitude of access technologies, different pricing schemes, and so on. 
Furthermore, the user may move within a peaceful area or in the middle of 
a crisis. 
 
Hence, the mobile node may need to adapt to the changes in the 
environment, depending on the specified policy. For example, the node 
may be configured to always use the best connection available, where best 
refers to the highest speed and best QoS, regardless of cost. However, 
should the mobile node be in the middle of a disaster, where the networks 
are congested, the node may revert to only send short text based messages 
e.g. in case the user wishes to tell his family that he is alive. 
 
CAM is suitable for scenarios where network nodes need to adapt to the 
environment. In this respect, there is no difference between the military 
and civilian environment, except that changes in the latter environment 
may not be as rapid and extensive as in the former environment. 
 
8.1.3 Self-healing networks 
 
The self-healing networks described in the military environment can be 
utilized in the civilian scenario as well. 
 
For example, rescue operations may require temporary backbone networks 
to support the mobile units. In the case of an ongoing disaster, it is possible 
that the temporary backbone is destroyed. Hence, by relying on CAM and 
the concept of self-healing networks described in Section 6.2. and 6.3., it is 
possible to ensure communications of the operation by reassigning tasks to 
nodes. However, there is one major difference from the military scenario. 
In a civilian rescue operation, there may not be so called "expendable 
nodes". Hence, the policy of reassigning tasks to nodes may be 
significantly different. 
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8.1.4 Incomplete trust 
 
In [73], a model where incomplete trust is deployed in a civilian 
environment is introduced. The scenario describes a typical e-commerce 
scenario, where a buyer makes a decision regarding available sellers and 
whether to engange in an e-commerce transaction at all. 
 
The notion of incomplete trust is used in a similar fashion as in the military 
scenario. A buyer collects information from the environment, which e.g. 
consists of friends and reliable sources. Based on collected information, 
the buyer may establish a sense of trust in the available sellers. The trust 
chains formed may be transitive in a similar fashion as in the military 
environment, for example, buyer A trusts buyer B, who trusts buyer C, 
who has experience with seller S. Based on the trust chain, A may evaluate 
the trust it has in seller S.  
 
When performing a transaction, the buyer evaluates the outcome; if the 
outcome of the transaction was good, the trust level of the seller will 
increase. However, if the outcome was bad, the trust leve will decrease. 
 
Typically, in a civilian environment, trust is difficult to establish but easy 
to maintain. 
 
8.1.5 Privacy protection 
 
The concept of privacy is relevant in the civilian environment as well as in 
the military one.  
 
On an individual level, personal privacy is in most countries protected by 
the legislation. The legislation should reflect the protection measures 
deployed in a network-centric environment. Consider the six privacy 
classes from the perspective of an individual: 
 
1. Data privacy. The user has the right and the ability to encrypt his 
data with strong cryptographic solutions. The data may only be 
disclosed to legitimate parties. For example, the government is 
typically not a legitimate party as far as private communications is 
concerned. There is no motivation whatsoever to enforce backdoor 
methods to the cryptograhic solutions (e.g. key escrow) although 
several governements claim that such methods are justified and are 
to be used to fight criminals or terrorists. However, the criminals 
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and terrorists do not obey such restrictions anyway. Hence, there is 
no motivation for private persons to give up their privacy. 
2. Identity privacy. The user has the right to protect his identity when 
engaging in communications. For example, it should not be 
possible for an illegitimate party to deduce the identity of 
communicating peers.  
3. Location privacy. The user has t right to protect the information 
about his location. For example, there should be no way for an 
illegitimate party to distinguish whether the user is roaming or at 
home, which would give away information as to e.g. when it is a 
suitable time for burglary. 
4. Time privacy. The user should be able to protect the exact time of 
occurrence of transactions, for example, electronic transactions 
between a buyer and a seller. No illegitimate party should be able 
to deduce when the "goods" and the money has exchanged hands. 
5. Existence privacy. The user has the right to protect his existence 
from environmental scanning. For example, the use of RFID 
comes with severe privacy concerns. If a human being is tagged 
with an RFID chip, it may be possible to track the user as he 
moves. The user may also carry around several products which 
contain RFID chips, making it possible for a vendor to e.g. scan a 
customer entering the premises to see what he is carrying around. 
It may even be possible to identify not only a certain type of 
product, but the specific product bought by a customer. With the 
possibilities for data and information fusion provided by modern 
information technology, it is crucial to ensure the existence 
privacy of individuals. 
6. Transaction privacy. The type of transactions a user is engaged in 
should not be disclosed to an illegitimate party. For example, a 
user engaged in e-commerce should be able to do so without the 
data revealing what sort of transactions take place at given times. 
 
The same concerns exist for companies as well. For example: 
 
1. Data privacy. The communication within a company or between 
the company and outsiders should be protected from disclosure 
from illegitimate parties in order to protect trade secrets, personnel 
information, and so on. 
2. Identity privacy. The communication infrastructure should not 
give away the identities of the communicating parties. For 
example, assume that company A and company B are planning a 
merge, and are thus engaged in communication. The 
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communication in itself may give away important intelligence and 
affect stock value, etc. 
3. Location privacy. It should not be possible to deduce the location 
of company employees by monitoring network traffic.  
4. Time privacy. The exact occurence of a transaction should not be 
disclosed. For example, the logistics system of a company should 
be protected so as not to reveal the exact time of occurrence of 
goods changing hands e.g. in the transportation phase. It should 
not be possible for a competitor to monitor where the goods reside 
at given points of time. 
5. Existence privacy. Companies tend not to want to hide their 
existence. However, it may require existence privacy solutions to 
protect its key personnel and customers. For example, meeting 
security should enforce existence privacy measures to protect the 
persons involved in the meeting. 
6. Transaction privacy. The type of transactions a user is engaged in 
should not be disclosed to an illegitimate party. For example, a 
company engaged in commercial transactions should be able to do 
so without the data revealing what sort of transactions take place at 
given times. 
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